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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the impact of information release in auctions and the 
change in auction organization on participant behavior.  The first two essays examine 
how the release of information affects the aggressiveness of bidding in highway contract 
procurement auctions.  The last study examines how changes in the auction format 
impacts bidding behavior and state revenue.  All three essays utilize data obtained from 
the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) on highway procurement auctions, 
let from January 1997 through November 2003.  
The first essay in chapter 3 examines the impact of a policy change by ODOT on 
the bidding behavior of firms participating in the auctions. In January 2000, the ODOT 
changed its policy regarding the release of the state’s engineering estimate.  Prior to that 
date, the state only released the engineering estimate after the bids were opened.  The 
policy change allowed for the release of the state’s engineering cost estimate to potential 
bidders prior to the bid letting.  Papers by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Goeree and 
Offerman (2003) argue that such information release by the seller should result in more 
aggressive bidding.  This essay empirically examines the response of auction participants 
to this change in policy.  Using data on bids and winning bids, the paper shows that the 
release of the additional information results in more aggressive bidding.  These results are 
further confirmed by the analysis conducted pooling Oklahoma and Texas procurement 
auction data.  In Texas, bidders are aware of the engineering cost estimate pre-bid letting 
during the entire sample period.  The comparison between Oklahoma and Texas indicates 
a significant decline in bids in Oklahoma after the information release.  This study 
x
concludes that this decrease in the level of bids is consistent with predictions of the 
theoretical models.       
The second essay in chapter 4 examines information release in auctions but in a 
different situation.  In ODOT auctions, a significant number of projects fail to be 
auctioned off the first time.  These projects are subsequently re-auctioned off at a later 
date.  For these auctions, potential bidders can observe the results of the first round of 
bidding for a project.  That is, potential bidders can observe the number of bidders, the 
bids submitted, the rejected low bid and the state’s estimate of the engineering cost for 
the project.  Given the substantial release of information in these auctions, I examine the 
difference in bidding between the first and second round auctions.  The results indicate 
bidding appears to be only modestly affected by such information release.  The additional 
information leads to somewhat lower average bids while the effect on the variance of bids 
is quite weak.     
The last essay in chapter 5 examines how a specific change in the bid letting 
procedures affects bidding.  Before April 2002, projects were auctioned off in both a 
morning and afternoon session (a sequential auction format).  The results of the morning 
session were announced before the afternoon session bids were due.  In March 2002 the 
department changed its auction format to a single session or simultaneous format.  
Evidence from the theoretical literature suggests that seller revenue may vary between 
sequential and simultaneous auction formats depending on several factors including the 
possibilities of synergies across projects.  Considering different levels of synergies, this 
paper compares the bidding behavior and seller revenue between the simultaneous and 
sequential auction formats.  The results indicate more aggressive bidding behavior after 
xi
the policy change occurred. Bidders bidding on multiple projects bid more aggressively 
in the simultaneous auction format.  The results do not provide consistent supportive 





1.1. Importance of the Study
Goods and services exchanged by means of government procurement auctions 
account for more than 10% of the United States GDP.1  Therefore government policies 
related to the design and implementation of these auctions are of vital importance to the 
sellers (or auctioneers) and to the buyers (or bidders).  Because the price discovery 
process in these auctions depends on the policies set forth by the government, it is evident 
that the final resource allocation also depends on these policies.  The motivation for 
studying auctions is largely due to the various policy concerns (Porter, 1995).  For 
example the literature examines how the government should optimally lease mineral or 
timber rights and procures various services.  The empirical literature that addresses 
government policy impacts on procurement auctions is relatively small and often 
confined to experimental studies.  This study contributes to the auction literature by 
investigating some key policy changes which have occurred in the procurement processes
of the Oklahoma Department of Transportation. 
The focus of this study is on two major policy changes relevant to the 
procurement auctions of the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) in 
auctioning off road construction contracts.  In every month ODOT auctions off around 
35-40 projects, worth around $44 million.  These auctions are conducted as first-price 
sealed-bid auctions and the lowest bidder is awarded the contract.  Chapter 3 of this study 
addresses a change in the information release policy by ODOT, which occurred in 
1 Bajari and Tadelis (2001), and McAfee and McMillan (1987).
2
January 2000.  For every project auctioned off, ODOT prepares a cost estimate known as 
the engineering cost estimate.  Before January 2000 the engineering cost estimate was 
made available only after the auctions concluded.  However, beginning in January 2000 
ODOT changed its policy and started to reveal this estimate prior to the bid letting. The 
theoretical auction literature suggests that when more information is available to bidders 
it increases the competition among the bidders and benefits the seller (Milgrom and 
Weber, 1982; Goeree and Offerman, 1999, 2003).  Chapter 3 examines the impact of this 
policy change on the subsequent bidding behavior and the seller’s revenue (in this 
context the procurement costs of ODOT) using ODOT auction data.  
Chapter 4 further investigates how information availability affects bidding in a
selected sample of re-auctioned off projects.  For a variety of reasons projects in this sub-
sample were not awarded in the first letting.  These projects are subsequently auctioned 
off in a later month.  At the end of the first auction, ODOT releases the results of the first 
round which includes all the bids submitted, together with the names of the bidders and 
the engineering cost estimate (since January 2000 ODOT revealed this estimate pre-bid 
letting as mentioned above).  Thus bidders in the second round have the ability to learn 
about their rivals’ bidding behavior in the first round and bid accordingly.  Chapter 4 
investigates the impact of the information made public after the first round on subsequent 
bidding behavior.
Chapter 5 focuses on another policy change implemented by ODOT that altered 
the auction format.  Until March 2002, ODOT had conducted monthly auctions in two 
sessions, one in the morning and another in the afternoon.  At the end of the morning 
session ODOT gave out the results of the morning session, i.e., winning bidders’ names 
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and their winning bids, as well as other bids with the names of the bidders.  Bidders in the 
afternoon session can take this information into account before they submit bids.  
However beginning of April 2002 ODOT switched to a single session auction format.  
Therefore bidders must submit all their bids simultaneously.  The auction literature 
suggests that such a change in the auction format affects bidding behavior and the seller’s 
revenue.  Chapter 5 examines the impact of the change in the auction format on 
subsequent bidding behavior in ODOT auctions. 
1.2. Objectives of the Study
The first objective of the study is to examine the impact of revealing the 
engineering cost estimate prior to bid letting on bidding behavior and test theories 
developed by Milgrom and Webber (1982) and Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003).  
Second this study examines the impact of additional information revealed after the 
conclusion of the first round of auctions, on projects that are not awarded.  The effect of 
the additional information revealed on the mean and the variance of bids is examined.  
Finally, this study compares the revenue performance between the two session and single 
session formats and test theories developed by Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) and Hausch 
(1986). 
1.3. Results of the Study
Chapter 3 provides supportive evidence for the theories by Milgrom and Weber 
(1982) and Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) that predict more aggressive bidding 
behavior with the release of additional information to the bidders.  The results indicate a 
significant decrease in the overall bids and in the winning bids after the policy change 
occurred in January 2000.  This in turn implies a decrease in procurement costs (which 
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implies an increase in the seller’s revenue) which is consistent with the theories.  The 
results of chapter 4 indicate that the impact of the additional information revealed after 
the first round of auctions about the rivals has only a moderate effect on the average bid.  
There is a moderate increase in the competition in the subsequent rounds of auctions.  
The information effect on the variance of bids is weak.  The results of chapter 5 indicate a 
decrease in the overall bids and in the winning bids after the change in the auction 
format.  
1.4. Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 of this study reviews the basic auction literature.  Chapter 3 investigates 
the change in the information release policy on bidding behavior and tests related 
theories.  Chapter 4 further examines the release of additional information on projects 
that were not awarded in the first round and the impact of this information on the 
subsequent rounds of auctions.  Chapter 5 examines the change in the auction format 
from two sessions to one session and tests the impact of the change in the auction format 
on the seller’s revenue.  Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of this study together 




2.1. Importance of Auctions
Governments use auctions in a wide range of transactions including defense 
contracts, selling timber rights, federal offshore oil and gas drainage lease sales, 
government construction contracts, and the sale of the right to use the electromagnetic 
spectrum for communications.  Also former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the 
countries of the former Soviet Union use auctions in the process of privatizing 
government enterprises (Krishna, 2002).  In addition to governments, large numbers of 
private institutions use auctions to sell goods such as antiques, art work, wine, automobile 
products2 and agricultural products (Dutch flower auctions, live cattle auctions, etc.).  
With the recent developments in e-commerce, web-based auctions conducted by private 
institutions have grown at a rapid rate, since the birth of these auctions in 1995.  For 
example the largest internet base auction site, eBay, had reached 3 billion dollars in 
transactions by 1999 with over 3 million items selling through its web site during a 
typical week (Lucking-Riley, Bryan and Reeves, 2000).  With these developments, 
auctions have become an important mechanism to exchanges of goods and services.
 It is important to examine why the seller (auctioneer) selects the auction as a 
selling mechanism.  The answer primarily lies with the uncertainty of the value of the 
object being auctioned off to the bidders as well as the seller.  All parties have different 
pieces of information about the value of the object.  The seller is interested to know the 
2 Business-to-business auto parts auctions among firms like General Motors, Ford and Daimler-Chrysler 
expect to handle $250 million transactions a year (Klemperer, 2000). 
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maximum amount that a buyer would be willing to pay for an object.  Instead of the seller 
putting a price tag on the object with limited information, auctions allow sellers to accept 
bidders’ individual valuations as bids.  Every bid submitted by a bidder summarizes the 
information available to a given bidder about the value of the object.3  Therefore, 
auctions may provide a good mechanism to the seller to lessen the information 
asymmetry problems that exists between buyers and the seller.  
For economists, auctions provide a vital testing ground to investigate the strategic 
behavior of economic agents and price formation under information asymmetry.     
McAfee and McMillan (1987) point out the perfect information assumption in standard 
economic models between the buyer and the seller would not hold in all transactions, 
particularly in auctions.  As such, the price determined by a given selling mechanism 
would not give the “right” signal to allocate resources which in turn would lead to 
economic inefficiencies.  Auctions provide a good framework for researchers to 
investigate the price discovery process under information asymmetry.  In addition to the 
information issues, Klemperer (2000) discusses in detail the applicability of auction-
theoretic tools in economics that are not necessarily auctions.  
2.2. Auction Forms
There are four main forms (types) of auctions identified in the literature.  They are 
an English auction, a Dutch auction, a first-price sealed-bid auction and a second-price 
sealed-bid auction (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Milgrom, 1989; Krishna, 2002).  In the 
English auction, the oldest auction type (Krishna, 2002), the auctioneer calls out prices 
(also known as oral ascending auction) and raises the value until only one bidder remains 
in the auction.  When the second highest bidder drops out from the auction, the highest 
3 This may not be the case under collusive behavior. 
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valuation bidder wins the auction at the second to last bidder’s price.  Unlike other 
auction types, in English auctions participants know the current bid and therefore bidders 
can bid accordingly.  In the Dutch auction, the auctioneer starts the auction with an initial 
high bid and then the price is lowered.  The first bidder who stops the price will win the 
auction.  In the first-price sealed-bid auction, bidders submit sealed-bids and the highest 
bidder is awarded the item at the amount he bids.  Similarly in the second-price sealed-
bid auction, bidders submit sealed bids but the highest bidder wins the auction at the 
second highest bidder’s price.  One of the main differences between the sealed-bid 
auction and the English auction is that, in the English auction bidders observe the bids 
submitted by other interested bidders in the auction.  This is not possible in the sealed-bid 
auction since all bidders submit only one bid.  The ODOT auctions are conducted using 
the first-price sealed-bid auction format.  Variations of the above four types of auctions 
are widely used, i.e., imposing a reserve price,4 royalty payment5 etc.           
2.3. The Value of the Object
The auction literature identifies two polar cases in classifying the value of objects.  
These are independent private value objects (and IPV models) and common value objects 
(and CV models). In the case of IPV, the bidder knows the value of the object to him and 
his value does not depend on the value to the other bidders.  Examples are flower 
auctions in the Netherlands and buying objects for personal use and consumption.
 CV objects have a re-sale value and bidders have a certain amount of uncertainty 
about the value of the item.  An example is when the government is selling mineral rights 
4 An auctioneer can set up a minimum acceptable bid and if the highest bid is lower than the reserve price, 
the seller can decide not to sell the item.  
5 In government auctions to award mineral rights, the government can impose a royalty payment where the 
winning bidder is suppose to pay a royalty fee for every unit of output produced by using the resource he 
bought at the auction.   
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to explore for underground oil, the value to a bidder depends on the amount of oil that 
can be extracted.  Also, if a bidder participates in an auction with the idea of re-selling 
the item, then the object has a common value.  However, in real-world auctions, objects 
will not have pure CV characteristics.  The majority of objects will have both private 
value components as well as common value components.  Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
have introduced a model, where objects have both private and common value elements, 
known as the Affiliated Value model (AV).  With affiliation, bidders’ valuations are 
correlated.  That is, when a bidder has a higher value for the object, he expects the other 
bidders to have higher values on average.  For example, the road construction contracts 
considered in this study can be identified as AV objects.  These contracts have both 
private value and common value cost components.  Firms may know their own cost 
estimate (depending on their efficiency levels) for a given project while it may have some 
uncertainty about the prices of inputs they may have to buy from the open market 
(concrete, iron etc.).  Thus bidders’ valuations are correlated through the common cost 
components in these contracts.  
2.4. Revenue Equivalence Theorem
From the seller’s perspective, it is an important question to ask which auction type 
generates the highest revenue.  Milgrom (2004) points out that the answer to this question 
depends on the specific circumstances.  Under a specific set of assumptions, the standard 
auction model6 predicts that revenue is the same on average, across auction types 
(English, Dutch, first-price or second-price auctions).  The standard auction model 
assumes a symmetric framework of analysis within which bidders are risk neutral and 
have independent private values (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 
6 The standard auction model is explained in detail by McAfee and McMillan (1987).
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1980).   Deviations from these assumptions do not guarantee the revenue equivalence 
among different mechanisms.  However, when it comes to choosing the appropriate 
auction type, revenue may not be the only concern.  For example, in the design of the 
Federal Communications Commission’s radio spectrum auctions, efficiency has been 
given a priority over revenue in order to benefit the bidders who may bid on adjacent 
projects (Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996).
When there are multiple objects, the question “what auction format would be 
preferred by the seller” again depends on specific circumstances, since it is more complex 
than the single object case.  The revenue performance depends on many factors, such as 
whether they are sold sequentially7 or simultaneously, whether the goods are substitute or 
complementary goods, the value of the objects, etc.  The design of the FCC spectrum 
auctions is an example that allows bidders to derive complementarities by winning 
adjacently located service areas (Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996).  Beside these concerns, 
Milgrom (2004) points out that, multi-unit auctions can also lead to phenomenon like 
collusive behavior.    
2.5. Procurement Auctions  
Procurement is a process where bidders compete for the right to sell their goods or 
services.  The government sector spends around $30-$40 billion every year on road 
construction alone through the procurement process (Krasnokutskaya, 2003).  Milgrom 
(2000) points out the procurement process can be complex in certain instances where the 
procurer accounts not only the price but also the other aspects such as the quality, e.g., 
government defense contracts.  In this literature, the revenue and efficiency performance 
7 In standard sequential auctions units are sold one at a time and in a short enough time, in such a way that 
bidders do not discount future payoffs (Krishna, 2002).
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of procurement auctions have been investigated under a number of different assumptions. 
This literature has explored the presence of asymmetric information among the buyers8, 
bid rigging and collusive behavior between the bidders,9 the entry of firms,10 and the 
presence of synergies across objects.11
2.6. Summary
This section highlights the importance of auctions as selling mechanisms, their 
importance to sellers and its importance to economists.  Also this section provides basic 
information about auction types, the value of the object(s), the revenue equivalence 
theorem, the use of multi-unit object auctions, and a brief description about the 
procurement auction literature.  The specific theoretical and empirical literature related to 
the topics that I investigate will be discussed in detail in the corresponding chapters.      
8 See Hendricks and Porter (1988), Hendricks, Porter and Tan (1993).
9 See Bajari and Ye (2001), Pesendorfer (2000), Poter and Zona (1993, 1999).
10 See De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003).
11 See De Silva (2005), Moreton and Spiller (1998), Ausubel et al (1997), and Gandal (1997).
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions 
3.1. Introduction
This study investigates how a change in the information available to bidders 
affects the outcomes of road construction procurement auctions held by the Oklahoma 
Department of Transportation (ODOT).  The change examined deals with the release of 
ODOT’s internal estimate of the cost of a project. This is referred to as the “engineer’s 
cost estimate.”  Prior to January 2000, ODOT did not reveal the engineering cost estimate 
to bidders before the bid letting.  However, they did release the engineer’s estimate after 
the bids were opened.  In January of 2000, this policy was changed and bidders could 
now request the engineering cost estimate for a project from ODOT prior to the bid 
letting.  This paper empirically examines whether this change in information available to 
bidders affects the bidding behavior of firms and likewise ODOT’s payments to 
contractors.  The theoretical literature suggests that such a release of seller information to 
bidders should increase competition among bidders and thus increase seller revenue.  The 
empirical literature that investigates the impact of the release of sellers’ information is 
largely confined to experimental studies.  Hence, the data on changes in the information 
release in ODOT procurement auctions should provide a natural testing ground to explore 
these issues. 
 In the theoretical literature there are a few key studies that analyze the impact of 
information on bidding behavior and seller revenue.  Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
12
theoretically demonstrate that a release of seller’s information12 about the value of the 
object in first-price affiliated value auctions can raise the expected price (in ascending 
auctions).  Another study by Goeree and Offerman (2003) develops an auction model 
where the value of the object has both private value and common value components.  
They show that the release of sellers’ information regarding the value of an object 
reduces the uncertainty of the common value component of the object.  This reduction in 
uncertainty leads to more aggressive bidding by bidders with a higher private value (in 
ascending auctions).  Thomas (1996) compares bidding with full information and partial 
information in first-price auctions.  With full information all bids are revealed ex post.  
With partial information only the winning bids are revealed.  He demonstrates ex post 
revelation of all bids by the seller leads to stronger competition and an increase in seller 
revenue.
The empirical literature that analyzes the impact of information in auctions is 
limited to experimental studies, as mentioned earlier.  Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) 
experimentally analyze the impact of the release of sellers’ information on the bidding 
behavior in auctions with affiliated private values.  In the case of first-price sealed-bid 
auctions, they find that ex ante revealing public information about the value of the object 
increases sellers’ revenue.  This result is consistent with the theoretical findings of 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) in first-price sealed-
bid auctions. 
This study examines the influence of information release on bidding and seller 
revenue in first-price sealed-bid auctions.  Bidding behavior in the periods before and 
12 For example, Milgrom and Weber (1982) discuss in the sale of a work of art, the seller can reveal 
appraisals obtained by him to the bidders.   
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after the change in information policy is modeled.  Overall this study finds a significant 
decrease in the average bid and average winning bid level after the release of the
engineer’s estimate to bidders by ODOT.  A decrease in the average winning bid implies 
an increase in the seller revenue in descending price auctions.  Thus this analysis is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Goeree and 
Offerman (1999, 2003) related to first-price auctions and information release by the 
seller.  The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  An overview of the theoretical and 
empirical literature related to this study is given in section 3.2.  A discussion of data 
sources is presented in section 3.3.  The empirical model is presented in section 3.4 and 
section 3.5 reports the results of the empirical analysis. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2. Literature Review
The role of information in auctions has been an important topic in both the 
theoretical and empirical literatures on auctions. While much of this literature has 
focused on asymmetries in information across bidders, a smaller literature has examined 
the release of information by the seller.  This section summarizes some key studies that 
investigate the impact of the release of seller information in auctions on seller revenue 
and bidding behavior.  
3.2.1. Theoretical Literature
Milgrom and Weber (1982) develop a model of competitive bidding with 
affiliated values that generates predictions about seller revenue.13 A specific feature of 
the affiliated value model is that the higher the value of the item for one bidder the more 
likely it is that the value will be higher for other bidders.  Typically when values are 
affiliated, the value of the object to the bidder depends on observed private value 
13  These predictions are related to first price, second price and English auctions.
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components and the unobserved common value components.  In ODOT auctions, there 
are unobserved common value elements (common costs) as well as observed private
value elements (private costs).  Observed private cost components may include material 
and labor costs observed by the firms.  Unobserved common cost components may 
include cost components that were uncertain at the time of bidding.  For example, in a 
given project the soil properties of the construction site may vary depending on the 
location of the project.  The relevant properties of the soil may not be fully known until 
the project is started and excavation begun.  Such costs can be treated as common costs 
that were uncertain at the time of bidding.  Therefore the total cost of a project to a bidder 
is a mix of private and common cost components.  
Milgrom and Weber (1982) examine the impact of information on sellers’ 
revenues in affiliated value auctions. In their model, they introduce an additional public 
information signal given by the seller to help bidders estimate the value of the object.  
Therefore this signal is affiliated with the bidders’ estimates and the common value 
components bidders observe.  Considering first-price auctions, Milgrom and Weber 
(1982) predict that a policy of publicly revealing the seller’s information cannot lower, 
and may raise the expected price. Revealing the seller’s information reduces the 
uncertainty of bidders.  This leads them to revise the common cost elements in their own 
estimates.  As a result their estimated value gets closer to the true value of the object 
causing them to bid more aggressively.  This is because a rational bidder, in a sealed-bid 
auction with the object having a common value component, always sets his bid equal to 
what he estimates to be the second highest bidder’s valuation given that all bidders are 
making the same presumption.  This bidding behavior is a result of bidders trying to 
15
avoid becoming a victim of the winner’s curse (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Smith,
1981).  Therefore with more information available to bidders, there should be an upward 
revision in bids (on average) and an increase in the seller’s revenue. 
Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) analyze a first-price sealed-bid auction model 
that generates predictions about seller’s revenue.  A key difference in Goeree and 
Offerman’s modeling framework compared with Milgrom and Weber (1982) is that 
bidders receive multiple signals.  That is, every bidder will receive different pieces of 
information related to the common value and private value components.  Hence, the 
value of the object to the bidder is a summary statistic of the two pieces of information.  
Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) argue that when the seller releases additional 
information, it will reduce the uncertainty of the common cost components.  This 
reduction in uncertainty will lead to more aggressive bidding behavior, particularly,
among risk averse bidders that are trying to avoid the winner’s curse.  Thus when the 
uncertainty of the common cost component is reduced, the private cost component 
weighs more heavily in their decision and bidders with lower private cost have an 
advantage over the other bidders.  Therefore aggressive bidding behavior leads to an 
increase in efficiency as well as revenue.14  Goeree and Offerman’s predictions are 
consistent with the predictions of the first-price auctions by Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
despite the differences in the modeling frameworks.  
14 Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) use the total expected surplus to show how the seller’s revenue 
increases with the release of information.  The total expected surplus is defined as the common value minus 
the winner’s expected cost; see Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) for details.  
16
Thomas (1996) analyzes the impact of ex-post information in first-price 
sequential auctions15 where bidders submit bids for multiple objects. The value of the 
objects is identical to all bidders. Thomas argues that when bidders bid for multiple 
objects, bidding behavior in a subsequent auction is different from the initial auction.
The difference in bidding behavior depends on what bidders learn from the revealed 
seller’s information and the outcome of the first auction (whether a given bidder wins or 
loses). The ex-post information in the model includes all bids submitted by other firms, 
the winning bid, and the identity of the winning bidder.  Thomas (1996) points out that 
when the seller reveals such information, bidders learn about their rivals’ private 
information.  Thomas examines the bidding behavior at different levels of information.  
First, he describes a situation where only the winning bidder is revealed ex-post (and no 
other bid information is revealed).  He then compares this to another situation where bids 
and names of bidders are revealed including the identity of the winning bidder.  Here, he 
shows that a policy of revealing full information leads to stronger competition among the 
bidders and to greater revenue for the auctioneer, versus a policy of revealing only the 
identity of the winning bidder.  The ex-post information received by the bidders in 
Thomas’s study is different from the ex-ante information received by the bidders in 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003).  But despite such 
differences in the nature of the information, his predictions are generally consistent with 
the other two studies.  The next section summarizes several key experimental studies that 
analyze the impact of information on seller revenue and on bidding behavior
15 Thomas calls these auctions “repeated auctions” rather than sequential auctions.  The difference is that, in 
a standard sequential auction the utility of the second object is zero due to unit demand.  Thomas assumes 
bidders would like to acquire all of the items and these items have identical values to all bidders.    
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3.2.2. Empirical Literature
Kagel and Levin (1986) emphasize the presence of the winner’s curse by 
analyzing the impact of public information in common value auctions with affiliated 
values (using first-price sealed-bid procedure).  Because the true value of the object is 
unknown to bidders and all bidders have the same value of the object, winning bidders 
may experience the winner’s curse due to judgmental failures about the true value of the 
object.  In this paper, private information signals are drawn for bidders from a uniformly 
distributed interval.  Here, two types of public information are employed separately.  
First, a common signal is given that helps the bidders to estimate the true value of the 
object.  This signal is an additional value drawn from the same interval from which the 
private information signals were drawn, and it can reduce the uncertainty of the bidders’ 
estimates.  The second type of public information reveals the lower bound of the interval 
of which the private signals were drawn.  In both cases, bidders have common knowledge 
about the information available to others. Due to the common value component, bidders 
may experience the winner’s curse.  In order to avoid the winner’s curse, bidders will 
discount their bids.  Kagel and Levin (1986) show the size of the bid discount increases
with the increase in the number of bidders and the dispersion of rival bids (or the size of 
the interval on which the bidders’ private information signals were drawn).  The authors 
examine how the variations in the number of bidders and the width of the interval affect 
the winner’s curse.  The results of this study show that in the absence of the winner’s 
curse the release of seller’s information increases seller revenue.  However, they also 
observe that in the presence of the winner’s curse public information reduces seller’s 
revenue.  They argue -- that when the number of bidders is large, the additional seller 
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information will cause optimistic bidders to make downward revisions in their bids (in 
ascending price auctions) which will offset the upward revision of less optimistic bidders 
and vice versa.
Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) test a key implication of the theory developed by 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) that is relevant to the first-price sealed-bid auctions with 
affiliated private values.  Using experimental methods, they examine the impact of the 
release of the seller’s information on revenue.  In their experiment, two series of auctions 
are conducted.  In the first auction, bidders submit bids based on the private values they 
receive,16 and in the second auction they bid both with the public information and the 
private value.  The profit received by a bidder is the value of the object minus the bid 
he/she submits at the auction. With respect to public information, two types of signals 
are employed in the experiment.  First an additional signal is given to the bidders, which 
is drawn from the same interval from which the bidders’ private values were drawn.  This 
signal gives an indication of the private values received by the other bidders.  Bidders are 
then asked to bid again for the same object but with the additional signal they observed.  
Second, bidders are informed about the center and the two boundaries of the interval 
from which the private values were drawn (in this case no additional signal is given).  
They report that revealing the seller’s information increases seller revenue and the 
revenue increases further with a higher level of public information.
Following the above two experimental studies, Goeree and Offerman (2002) 
experimentally analyze some key predictions of the theoretical model they developed in 
their in 1999 and 2003 papers.  The experimental setting is a first-price sealed-bid auction 
16 Bidders’ private values are determined in the following manner:  A value (x0) is randomly drawn from 
the interval of $25-$125 which has a uniform distribution.  Then bidders’ private values are drawn from an
interval within this interval where x0 is the center of the interval.
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with both private and common value components.  In the experiment, subjects are given 
both private and common value signals.   By combining these two pieces of information, 
bidders then determine their bids.  Both signals are drawn from two different uniformly 
distributed intervals.  At the end of each set of auctions, all bids and the common value of 
the object are revealed to the bidders.  However, the private and common value signals 
and the winner’s profits are not revealed.  In a second set of auctions, a seller’s signal 
regarding the common value component is provided to bidders.  The signal is drawn from 
the same interval where the common value signals are drawn.  With the disclosure of the 
seller’s information (an additional signal given to the bidders), the uncertainty about the 
common value component is reduced.  The authors show that a decrease in the 
uncertainty of the common value component is accompanied by an increase in the seller 
revenue and a decrease in the winning bidder’s profits. 
Some characteristics of the auctions analyzed by Kagel and Levin (1986), Kagel, 
Harstad and Levin (1987) and Goeree and Offerman (2002) are similar to the 
characteristics of ODOT auctions.  The ODOT auctions are first-price sealed-bid 
auctions.  Bidders participate in ODOT auctions have their cost estimates prepared based 
on the private information as well as the public information about the common cost 
components available to them.  Affiliation occurs through the project-specific common 
cost components. The above experimental studies compare bidding situations where 
different amounts of public information are available to bidders.  In the analysis that 
follows, the difference in public information will depend upon the release of ODOT’s 
estimate of the cost of a project.  The ODOT auction setting is most closely related to the 
situation modeled by Goeree and Offerman (2002).   
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In a previous study directly related to ODOT auctions, De Silva, Dunne and 
Kosmopoulou (2002) examine the impact of the release of information on the results of a 
set of morning auctions on the bidding behavior in the afternoon auctions.  These 
auctions are held once every month in two sessions, a morning and afternoon session held 
on the same day.  At the end of the morning session, ODOT releases the results from the 
morning session including the name of the winning bidder, winning bid and bids 
submitted by other firms with their names. This is the case where the seller reveals 
information ex-post. In the afternoon session, participants are thus informed about the 
results from the morning session.  De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002) point out 
that bidding in the afternoon auctions can be affected by the outcome of the morning 
auctions due to the information released concerning the morning session. They find that 
bidding is more competitive in the afternoon session when more information is available.
In conclusion, regardless of the nature of information released in the above 
theoretical and empirical studies, the studies generally indicate increased competition 
among bidders and increased seller revenue when more information is available to 
bidders.  In the situation studied herein, if the ODOT’s policy of revealing the 
engineering estimate (prior to bid letting) affects bidding behavior, a decline in the 
average bids and the average winning bids should be observed.  The decline in average 
bid implies an increase in competition while the decline in average winning bid implies 
an increase in seller revenue.   
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3.3. Data
This study employs data obtained from ODOT, on auctions for construction projects for 
the period of January 1997 to March 2002.17  For every project, detailed information 
regarding bidder and project characteristics has been obtained.  This includes the 
engineer’s estimate of the project prepared by ODOT, names of the contractors that 
purchased project plans from ODOT (project plan holder list), bids submitted by 
contractors with their names, winning bidder’s name and the winning bid (for the projects 
that are awarded), and the number of calendar days specified by ODOT to complete a 
project.  In order to submit a bid, a firm has to be pre-qualified18 and also has to be a plan 
holder19 for a particular project.  The lowest bidder is almost always awarded the contract 
if they satisfy the state’s reserve price.  ODOT may reject low bids that are 7% above the 
engineer’s estimate of ODOT, though they do not always enforce this reserve rule.
A key variable of interest in this study is the state’s engineering cost estimate 
prepared by ODOT.  The estimate contains cost items specified in terms of material 
requirement20 or description of work21.  For each item, the unit cost and the estimated 
total costs are given in the estimate.  However the estimate does not identify the labor 
cost separately.  For example in an asphalt project, the quantity of asphalt required and 
the unit cost are specified in the estimate.  The unit cost of asphalt incorporates both the 
material and the labor costs for paving a unit of asphalt.  Adding across all individual 
items gives the total estimate for a project.  As discussed above, ODOT changed its 
17 The data comes from three reports in the ODOT web site, namely the as read bid report, the low bid 
report and the award notice.    
18 In order to pre qualify; firms have to submit certified financial statement to ODOT. 
19 A firm submitting a bid must purchase the project plan from the ODOT.  Firms purchasing plans are 
known as plan holders.  The project plan gives a detailed description of the project design features.       
20 For example, quantities of asphalt, concrete, steel, different pipe types etc.  
21 For example removal of asphalt paving, construction traffic control, culvert end treatment, removal of 
guard rail, sediment removal etc. 
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policy with regard to the release of this information (the estimates prepared by ODOT for 
the projects) in January 2000.   
 In order to analyze the impact of releasing the cost estimate prior to bid letting, 
this study identifies three time periods in the data where the information regarding the 
cost estimate or the use of the information regarding the cost estimate may differ.  The 
period from January 1998 to December 1999 is identified as the period of Info-1.22
During this period ODOT did not reveal the engineering cost estimate to the contractors.   
Info-2a is a six month period from January 2000 to June 2000.  The period Info-2b is 
from July 2000 to March 2002.  In the Info-2a and Info-2b periods bidders are aware of 
ODOT’s cost estimate of the project.  The Info-2a period is included as a separate period 
to observe bidders’ immediate response to the change in ODOT’s information release 
policy.  This flexibility on the specification is allowed since it may take time for bidders 
to learn how to incorporate the state’s cost estimate into their estimation procedures and 
to learn how other bidders incorporate the information into their bids.  This specification 
allows for such a period of transition.   
In order to show how bidding differs across the three periods, plots of the 
distribution of bids for the Info-1, Info-2a and Info-2b periods is shown in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1 presents the kernel density plots for the bid distributions for the three periods.  
All bids are normalized by the engineer’s estimate of the project which allows comparing 
bids across auctions of different project size.  The relative bid indicates the proportion a 
bid is above (more than one) or below (less than one) the engineer’s estimate for a 
22 In order to construct the variables that control bidder history, and rival history (described in the next 
section), empirical analysis is started from January 1998 even though data is available from January 1997.
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project.  The left most, curve in Figure 3.1 represents the Info-2b period indicating a 
downward shift in the distribution of bids compared to the Info-1 period. 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the data from January 1998 to March 
2002 for the full sample and the sample broken out by the three sub-periods.  This table 
includes statistics on the number of auctions, number of plan holders, number of firms, 
average number of plan holders per auction, number of bidders, average number of 
bidders per auction, number of auctions with bids, the average relative bid and the 
average winning bid.  A total of 5092 bids coming from 1611 auctions during the sample 
period have been employed in the analysis.  Notice that the numbers of bids are far lower 
than the number of plan holders (9190) meaning that not all plan holders bid. The total 
number of firms participating in these auctions over the entire period is 263.  On average 
there are 5.7 plan holders and 3.2 bidders per auction.  Notice the decreasing pattern in 
the mean relative bids and mean relative winning bids starting from the period of Info-1 
and in the two subsequent periods.  This is the same pattern that is observed in Figure 3.1.  
3.4. Empirical Analysis
This section presents an empirical model to analyze the impact of the change in 
the information policy by ODOT on bidding behavior.  First the overall bid level is 
examined in order to observe whether there is a decrease in the bids due to the 
information release.  Then the impact of information on seller revenue is investigated.  
The winning bids are used as a measure of the seller’s revenue.  
The dependent variable for both the bid and the winning bid regressions is 
measured relative to the engineer’s estimate (the same as the relative bid variable seen in 
Figure 3.1).  The relative bid is used in order to be able to compare bidding across 
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auctions of different project size.  A mean equation and a standard deviation equation is 
estimated in the analysis.  The objective is to examine the impact of the information 
released on both the mean and the variance of bids and winning bids.  The regression 
equation takes the following form
iiii XbInfoaInfoy εγβββ ++++= 22 210
with an error structure 
εi  ~  (0, σi2).
The standard deviation equation (sigma) takes the following form 
iiii biddersofbInfoaInfo )__log(#22 3210 ϕϕϕϕσ +++= .
In the mean equation, Info-2a and Info-2b represent the controls for informational 
differences and bidders reaction to information over time across the time periods.  The 
other control variables can be grouped into four major categories and are contained in the 
matrix X.  They are auction characteristics variables, bidder characteristics variables, rival 
characteristic variables, and variables that controls for aggregate time varying factors.
Info-2a and Info-2b are two dummy variables that control for the time periods --
the six month period immediately after the change in information policy and the 
subsequent period thereafter.  The omitted group is the period where the engineering cost 
estimate was not released prior to the bid letting.  The hypothesis is that the revelation of 
engineer’s estimate by ODOT prior to bid letting will lower the overall bids and the 
winning bids during the periods of Info-2a and Info-2b.  A decrease in the relative 
winning bids in Info-2a and Info-2b periods implies an increase in the seller’s revenue.  
It is very unlikely that all firms would respond equally to the information release.  
One possibility is that large and small firms may respond differently to the information 
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release since they have different levels of expertise in bid preparation and may have 
different levels of past experience.  As a measure of firm size, the maximum backlog of a 
firm during the sample period is used.23  Porter and Zona (1993) have used this variable 
to measure firm capacity as well.  In this study, a firm with a maximum backlog of more 
than 7 million dollars is considered as a large firm.24  If the maximum backlog is less than 
or equal to 7 million dollars, the firm is considered as a small firm.  To allow for 
differences in the response to the information release between these two size groups, the 
firm size variable is interacted with the information variables (time period controls).  This 
yields six different time period-project size dummy variables -- large firms during the 
period of Info-1 (Info-1 LF), small firms in the period of Info-2a (Info-2a SF), large firms 
in the period of Info-2a (Info-2a LF), small firms in the period of Info-2b (Info-2b SF), 
and large firms in the period of Info-2b (Info-2b LF).  Small firms in the period of Info-1 
(Info-1 SF) are the omitted group in this specification of the empirical model.
The remaining variables in the model are represented by the matrix X.  There are 
four auction characteristics variables -- project types, project size, source of funding for 
the project and the number of bidders.  In case of the project type variables, all projects 
are grouped into six main categories based on the description of the project.  This 
includes asphalt paving projects, clearance and bank protection projects, bridge projects, 
grading and draining projects, concrete work and traffic signals and lighting projects.  All 
the other projects are considered as miscellaneous projects25 and it is the omitted group in 
23 Backlog is computed for the firms that won contracts.  Details of the construction of this variable are in 
the next section.  For the firms that have not won any contract the engineering estimate of the largest 
project they bid is considered as the firm size.   
24 Maximum backlog of firms vary from a minimum of $801 to $48 million.  The $7 million cut off point 
includes 15% of the all firms in the sample in the large firm group.
25 Miscellaneous projects include landscaping, water line adjustments, intersection modification, parking 
etc.
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the regression.  Project type variables control the variability in these broad classes of 
projects.  With respect to project size, large (Large Projects=1) and small projects (Large 
Projects=0) are identified based on the distribution of engineering cost estimate.  Large 
projects are different in complexity and work requirement (such as Disadvantaged 
Business Enterprise26 program requirements). Therefore bidding behavior may vary by
project size.  All projects with an engineering cost estimate over one million dollars are 
considered as large projects which includes approximately 20% of all projects in the 
sample.  
With respect to project financing, there are two major sources--projects that are 
funded by the U.S. federal government and the projects that are funded by the Oklahoma 
state government.  In the projects funded by the Federal government, the contractors have 
to abide by the guidelines set forth by the U.S. government.27 Therefore a dummy 
variable is included to identify the projects funded by the federal government.  Federal 
Projects=1 if the project is funded by the U.S. federal government, otherwise it is zero.  
The next auction characteristic variable is a measure of auction-level competition among 
the bidders.  As in the literature the number of bidders (Log of Number of Bids) is used as 
a control for the degree of competition in the auctions (Hendricks, Pinske and Porter 
1999; De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou 2002, 2003).   
Bidder characteristic variables include a firm’s past winning to bid ratio and 
utilization of a firm’s capacity.  As in De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003), this 
26 Disadvantaged Business Enterprise is defined as an enterprise with more than 51% ownership by socially
and economically disadvantaged groups as defined by the Federal Government.  It also must be a small 
business defined by the Small Business Administration regulations.  If it is a general contractor the firms 
gross receipts averaged over a three years period cannot exceed $17.40 millions. 
27 The main contractor of a U.S. government funded project is responsible to provide equal opportunity to 
disadvantaged business groups, when assigning sub-contracts.  
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study employs the winning-to-bid ratio to measure past success rate in auctions for a 
given firm.  It is the past number of wins divided by the past number of bids submitted by 
a firm at the time of bidding.  Second, the utilization rate is the backlog of a firm divided 
by the maximum backlog of that firm during the sample period.28  This indicates the 
capacity utilized by a given firm for the contracts already won.  Backlog29 is the dollar 
value of the unfinished amount of work for the contracts that a firm has won.  Similar 
capacity measures have been used in the empirical auction literature analyzing highway 
procurement auctions.30
As in De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003) this study employs a 
variable that controls for rival heterogeneity. This measures the rivals past success in 
auctions to control for the toughness of competition.  This variable is constructed as 
follows.  For every firm in an auction (all plan holder firms in an auction), the number of 
auctions won in the past was counted and divided by the number of plans held by that 
firm for the same period.  These ratios were then averaged across the rivals of a given 
firm in an auction to obtain an overall measure of the competitiveness of the rivals.
In the analysis that follows, it is important to control for factors that change over 
time other than the information.  Four variables are included that control for monthly 
variation in the amount of projects being let, the distribution of projects being let, the 
number of potential bidders, and the economic climate.
28 For firms that never won a contract, the utilization rate is zero meaning that these firms have full capacity 
available for utilization.
29 The backlog variable and the project type variables described earlier are the same variables that have 
used in De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003).
30  For example, Porter and Zona (1993) have used the utilization rate (defined as the backlog of a firm at a 
particular time divided by the maximum backlog of the firm) as a measure of firm capacity.  Bajari and Ye 
(2002) have used firm capacity defined as a given firm’s used capacity (measured as the total winning bids 
amounts up to that time) over the firms’ total winning bids for a season (one year period). 
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The first variable controls for differences in the amount of projects auctioned off 
across time.  Such variations occur due to budgetary conditions and seasonal factors in 
the State of Oklahoma.  The monthly variation in the total value of estimates is shown in 
Figure 3.2.  It measures monthly fluctuations in real dollars (millions) for all projects.  
These monthly fluctuations in the available project dollars could affect average bidding 
behavior.  The second variable measures the number of projects auctioned in a month 
relative to the number of firms participating in the bidding.  This variable controls for two 
aspects of the distribution of projects being let.  First it controls the number of projects 
auctioned off in a given month.  Second it also controls for the number of firms interested 
in bidding in a given month.  This is important since the real value of monthly estimate 
total does not control for the actual number of projects in a month.  The third measure is a 
variable that controls for the distribution of project sizes in a given a month.  A measure 
is included to account for project size inequality and is constructed in the same manner as 
a Herfindhal index – the sum of the project shares squared in a month.  A larger value 
indicates a more concentrated project mix.  Bidding behavior could be affected in a given 
month when a large portion of the project funds in a month are allocated to a few 
projects.  Finally, the state unemployment rate is included to control for cyclical factors 
that may affect the Oklahoma economy.  Summary statistics of the regression variables 
discussed above are presented in Table 3.2.   
In the standard deviation equation, σi is allowed to vary with the information 
variables and the number of bidders in an auction.  The theoretical literature suggests that 
the uncertainty about the value of the object decreases when more information is 
available to bidders.  This is due to a reduction in the uncertainty in the common value 
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components of the object.  In this case, the release of engineering cost estimate may 
reduce uncertainty of the common cost components of the projects.  This would lead to a 
reduction in the variance in the overall bid level.  The mean equation together with the 
standard deviation equation is estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 
3.5. Results and Discussion
  The regression results for different specifications of the model are given in Table 
3.3 through Table 3.7.  The upper half of the main tables report the results of the mean 
equation while the lower section of each table reports the results of the standard deviation 
equation.  Table 3.3 presents the overall bid level (Relative Bid) regression results for 
three specifications.  The first column of Table 3.3 includes the information variables 
(time period variables), auction characteristics, bidder characteristics, rival characteristics 
and time varying control variables.  In the mean equation, the results indicates a 
systematic reduction in the overall bid level during the periods of Info-2a (January, 2000 
to June 2000) and Info-2b (July 2000 to March 2002) relative to the period of Info-1 
(period before January 2000).  This result is consistent with the predictions by Milgrom 
and Weber (1982), about the release of seller information on bidding behavior in first-
price auctions.  The standard deviation equation in the first column indicates a significant 
decrease in the variance in the Info-2b period which is consistent with decrease in the 
uncertainty among bidders.  
In column (2) of Table 3.3, the firm size interaction terms are included in order to 
see the effect of the release of information on large and small firms.  The results in the 
mean equation indicate that large firms appear to alter the bids more in response to the 
additional information.  In case of the large firms, results indicate approximately 0.058
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and 0.082 reduction in the relative bids in the two subsequent periods after January 2000 
compared to the period before January 2000. The decrease in bids for smaller firms is 
considerably more muted.  The result observed here is different from the initial 
explanation about differential impacts of the release of information between large and 
small firms.  The standard deviation equation does not show a systematic reduction in 
variance when the firm size-time period interactions are included.  A likelihood ratio test 
was conducted between the models in column (1) and column (2) in order to test the 
statistical significance of the interaction terms.  The test supports the inclusion of 
interaction terms in the model in column (2).
Column (3) of Table 3.3 is an alternative specification to column (1).  It presents 
the results of the relative bid regression without the time varying monthly variables. The 
results from this column can be compared with column (1) to see how sensitive the 
results are to the exclusion/inclusion of the other monthly variables. The results indicate 
that exclusion of these monthly variables does not change the coefficients in a significant 
manner and it is consistent with the insignificance of these four variables in column (1) 
and column (2).     
Among the other results in Table 3.3, the large projects variable is significant in 
all three models and bidders bid relatively low for larger projects indicating more 
competition for larger projects.  The same is true when examining the federal projects –
bidders bid somewhat more aggressively for these projects.  With regards to firm 
characteristics, firms with higher winning-to-bid ratios and lower capacity utilization 
submit, on average, lower relative bids.  These results are consistent with the results 
reported in De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003).  Also, the negative and 
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significant coefficient on the Log Number of Bidders variable indicates there is more 
competition as the number of bidders increase.  The monthly variables do not have a 
significant impact on the bidding behavior in any of these models. 
 Table 3.4 presents the results of the winning relative bids models.  The winning 
relative bid regression will tell us how the seller revenue is affected by the change in the 
information release policy.  Columns (1), (2) and (3), have the same specification for the 
models as in Table 3.3.  The mean equation in Column (1) of Table 3.4 indicates a 
decline in the winning relative bids in the Info-2a and in the Info-2b periods relative to 
the period before January 2000.  Winning relative bids decrease by 0.041 in the Info-2b
period.  The lower winning bid is consistent with the improvement in seller revenue 
predicted by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Goeree and Offerman (2003).  Also our 
results are consistent with the experimental results by Kagel and Levin (1986), Kagel, 
Harstad and Levin (1987) and Goeree and Offerman (2002) about the disclosure of seller 
information.  These studies show an increase in the seller’s revenue when more public 
information is available to the bidders.  Column (2) shows the winning bid level of large 
firms in info-2b period have declined by 0.04 relative to large firms in the period before 
January 2000 (Info-1).  Also small firms show a 0.04 decline in the winning bid level 
relative to small firms in the period before January 2000 (Info-1).  The expectation that
large firms would be less responsive (relative to the small firms) to the information 
release is not supported by the relative winning bid regression. Looking at the other 
variables, the rivals’ previous winning to plan holder ratio has a negative and significant 
impact as in De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003).  A likelihood ratio test between 
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the models in column (1) and column (2) indicates that the firm size and information 
interaction terms are not statistically significant in the relative winning bid regression.
Table 3.5 presents robustness checks for the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
respectively.  Recall that the relative bid tells us the proportion above or below the 
engineer’s estimate of a particular bid.  The project size (measured in term of engineer’s 
estimate) varies from a minimum of $2400 to a maximum of $32 million.  The relative 
importance of the project is not captured by the relative bid since it treats all projects of 
different size equally.  Therefore weights are assigned to the model based on the project 
size (using the engineer’s estimate of a project as the weighting variable) so that the 
relative bid of a larger project has more weight in the regression than a smaller project.  
Clearly, from a cost perspective, the State of Oklahoma will be more concerned with 
bidding on a large project than a small project.  Table 3.5 column (1) and column (2) 
present the results of the weighted relative bid regression and weighted winning relative 
bid regressions, respectively.  The results show that in the Info-2b period there is a 0.091
decline (columns (1)) in the relative bids and 0.069 declines (column (2)) in the winning 
relative bids relative to the period before January 2000.  Notice that there is a larger 
decrease in the bid level and the winning bid level compared to the results in Table 3.3 
and Table 3.4.  There is also a significant decrease in the variance of all bids in the period 
after June 2000 (Info-2b). 
In addition to the weighted model a fixed effects model is estimated to control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity.  In doing so, this study identifies the 50 firms in the 
sample that submit the greatest number of bids.  All the other firms are grouped together 
under one group.  Bajari and Ye (2001) have adopted this approach identifying the 11 
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largest firms in the sample when they estimate their fixed effects model.  In this study, 
the fixed effects capture the heterogeneity across the top 50 firms (identified in terms of 
participation, i.e. submitting bids).  The remaining firms in the sample are modeled with a 
common fixed effect as in Bajari and Ye’s (2001).  In this sample the top 50 firms have 
won approximately 70% of the total value of projects awarded during the sample period. 
Table 3.6 reports results of the fixed effects model.  It reports three models with 
firm fixed-effects -- column (1) overall bid level, column (2) the winning bid, and column 
(3), the weighted model for winning bid regression.  Results in column (1) and (2) of 
Table 3.6 are consistent with the previously estimated models.  Column (1) indicates a 
0.062 decline in the overall bid level in the period after June 2000 (Info-2b).  There is a 
significant decrease in the variance of all bids (column (1)) in the period after June 2000 
(Info-2b).  A likelihood ratio test between the two models in column (1) of Table 3.6 and 
column (1) of Table 3.3 indicates that fixed effects matter in the model. The results in 
column (2) indicate that the winning bids decline in the period after January 2000.  
Column (3) indicates a 0.058 decrease in the winning bid in the Info-2b period when the 
model incorporates both weights and fixed effects.  The results of this table are consistent 
with the previous results in Tables 3.3 to 3.6.    
The standard deviation equations reported in Tables 3.3-3.6 show a significant 
decline in the variances of relative bids in the Info-2b period at the overall bid level.  The 
reduction in the variance with more information is more consistent with a reduction in the 
uncertainty.  It is also consistent with the theory of Goeree and Offerman (1999) that 
predicts a reduction in the uncertainty when more information is available to the bidders.
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As in the literature, I also examined the changes that occur in the money left on 
the table.  Bajari and Ye (2001) define money left on the table as the difference between 
the second lowest bid and the winning bid.  They argue that if firms had complete 
information about their competitors’ cost (in road construction projects) then the amount 
of money that should be left on the table would be near zero.  Money left on the table is 
defined as the proportional difference between the reserve price and winning bid or the 
proportional difference between the second lowest bid and the winning bid which ever is 
smaller. In cases where the second lowest bid exceeds the engineer’s estimate, this study 
considers the difference between the reserve price and the winning bid. A significant 
amount of money left on the table implies significant differences in the private 
information among the bidders.    
Table 3.7 reports the results of money left on the table for the three models.  The 
first column shows the un-weighted regression results.  The second column shows the 
weighted results and the third column shows the weighted model incorporating firm fixed 
effects.  The results in column (1) indicate that there appears to be more money left on 
the table in the latter two periods than in the period before January 2000.  However, these 
results are quite sensitive to specification. Columns (2) and (3) show this.  In both the 
weighted model, and the weighted model with fixed effects, the information variables are 
not statistically significant meaning that there is no significant differences in the amount 
of money left on the table after January 2000.  According to Bajari and Ye’s (2001) 
argument, this implies bidders have more or less the same knowledge of their rivals’ 
private cost information (before and after January 2000).  
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One concern in interpreting the above results is that the information period 
variable may be picking up some other factor that is uncontrolled for in the regression.  
This is the classic omitted variable bias problem.  In order to examine this possibility, the 
study use data on Texas auctions to compare with Oklahoma auctions. In Texas, the 
engineering cost estimate has been revealed prior to bid letting during the entire sample 
period from January 1998 to March 2002).  Therefore there is no informational difference 
as in Oklahoma across time periods. However, by comparing across Oklahoma and 
Texas, common shocks hitting both states can be controlled that might affect bidding 
behavior.  Clearly, the common shock that is most concerned about is the recession that 
occurred in 2001.31
The analysis is conducted pooling Oklahoma and Texas samples together.  The 
objective is to examine whether there is a significant difference in bidding across the 
periods in Texas as compared to Oklahoma.  The sample considered is from January 
1998 to March 2002 time period for both Oklahoma and Texas data.  The Texas data 
consist of 27,422 plan-holder observations with 16,685 bids.  A total of 4088 auctions 
have been auctioned off during the period considered.  The average relative bid for the 
Texas sample before January 2000 is 1.111 and for the sample after it is 1.063.  Table 3.8 
provides summary statistics.
The same procedure is used to measure the variables in Texas as in Oklahoma.  
Separate time period dummies are included for Texas bidding in order to compare the 
bidding pattern across states.  The results from the pooled model are presented in Table 
3.9.  Again, the results indicate that in Oklahoma bids are lower in post January 2000 
31 This recession has occurred for a period of eight months between March, 2001 and November 2001.  
These recession dates are provided in the National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
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period.  A statistical test of the difference between the Oklahoma base period and 
Oklahoma post 2000 period and Texas base period and Texas post 2000 period (the 
difference-in-difference of the estimates) indicates that the decline in relative bids is 
larger in Oklahoma for the Info-2b period, as compared to Texas.32  There is also a 
decline in the variance of bids on Oklahoma in period Info-2b.
As a robustness check for the results in Table 3.9 two models are re-estimated 
using the weighting procedure discussed above.  The results of the weighted models are 
presented in Table 3.10. The results indicate that the decline in Oklahoma is significantly 
greater than the decline in Texas at the overall bid level.  The results also show a similar 
pattern at the winning bid level but at the 10% significance level.  The variance of bids 
also declined more in Oklahoma relative to Texas while there is no statistical difference 
in the variance of winning bids between the two states. Overall the Oklahoma-Texas 
results further supports the findings of this study.
3.6. Conclusion
This study investigates a change in the release of information to bidders prior to 
bid letting in road construction auctions.  The impact of this policy change on the overall 
bid level and the winning bid level is investigated.  The results indicate a strong effect on 
the overall bid level with a 0.066 decline in the period after June 2000 (Table 3.6 column 
(1)). This implies that competition among the bidders has increased.  Looking at the 
winning bids there is a 0.063 decline in the average winning bids in the period after June 
2000 (Table 3.6, column (3)).  The reduction in the winning bid level implies a 
significant reduction in the procurement costs of ODOT after the change in the 
32 A coefficient test is performed after estimating the models in Table 9.  The null hypothesis for the test is 
the difference between OK-Info1 period and OK-Info-2b period is same as the difference between TX-Info-
1 period and TX-Info-2b period.  This was rejected with 5% significance for the overall bid level analysis. 
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information policy.  These results are further supported by the analysis conducted by 
pooling data for Oklahoma and Texas.  Only in Oklahoma is this dramatic decline at the 
overall bid level during the post January 2000 period observed.  Further this study shows 
a significant decline in the variance of relative bids in the post January 2000 period which 
is consistent with a reduction in uncertainty when more information is available to 
bidders.  These results are in general agreement with the auction literature that predicts an 
increase in competition that benefits seller and a reduction in uncertainty among the 
bidders when more public information is available. 
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Figure 3.1:  Distributions of Relative Bids (bids normalized by the engineer’s estimate) 
for the Three Time Periods.
The right most curve represents the period before January 2000 (represented by Info-1) 
followed by the middle curve for the six months transition period represented by Info-2a








0 1 2 3Relative Bid




  Figure 3.2:  Real Value of Monthly Project Estimate Totals
Real Value of Monthly Project Total in $ Millions 










































































Number of Auctions 1611 798 196 617
Number of Plan Holders 9190 4421 1116 3653
Number of Firms 263 196 129 181










Number of Bids 5092 2445 597 2050










Number of Auctions 
with Bids
1531 754 186 591


















Standard deviations are in the parenthesis.
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Table 3.2:  Means of the Regression Variables
Variables Mean      (Std )
Relative Bid 1.062     (0.282)
Money Left on the Table (MLT) 0.071     (0.094)
Info-1 0.498     (0.500)
Info-2a 0.115     (0.319)
Info-2b 0.388     (0.487)
Info-1 LF 0.208     (0.406)
Info-1 SF 0.290     (0.454)
Info-2a LF 0.040     (0.195)
Info-2a SF 0.075     (0.264)
Info-2b LF 0.147     (0.354)
Info-2b SF 0.241     (0.428)
Large Projects 0.234     (0.424)
Federal Projects 0.543     (0.498)
Log of Number of Bids 1.087     (0.533)
Rivals Previous Winning to Pan Holder Ratio 0.149     (0.062)
Firm’s Own Winning to Bid Ratio 0.261     (0.144)
Utilization Rate 0.237     (0.282)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of Engineering 
Estimates
          17.391     (0.698)
Monthly Number of Firms per Project 2.076     (0.695)
Project Concentration Ratio 0.143     (0.081)
Unemployment  3.772     (0.680)
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Table 3.3:  Relative Bid Regressions for Three Specifications                                           
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 1.252* (0.136) 1.225* (0.136) 1.310* (0.033)
Info-2a -0.042* (0.015) -0.032* (0.013)
Info-2b -0.074* (0.009) -0.072* (0.008)
Info-1 LF 0.044 (0.012)
Info-2a SF -0.022 (0.022)
Info-2a LF -0.023 (0.017)
Info-2b SF -0.042* (0.013)
Info-2b LF -0.070* (0.012)
Project-1 -0.120 (0.029) -0.119* (0.029) -0.119* (0.029)
Project-2 -0.082 (0.047) -0.078 (0.047) -0.080 (0.047)
Project-3 -0.113* (0.029) -0.110* (0.029) -0.110* (0.029)
Project-4 -0.132* (0.029) -0.131* (0.029) -0.126* (0.029)
Project-5 0.171* (0.063) 0.175* (0.063) 0.168* (0.063)
Project-6 -0.163* (0.032) -0.157* (0.032) -0.159* (0.032)
Large  Projects -0.074* (0.010) -0.076* (0.010) -0.073* (0.010)
Federal  Projects -0.024* (0.010) -0.024* (0.010) -0.024* (0.010)
Log of Number of Bids -0.016 (0.008) -0.013 (0.008) -0.018* (0.008)
Rivals’ Previous Winning to 
Plan Holder Ratio 
-0.038 (0.069) -0.041 (0.070) -0.038 (0.069)
Firms’ Own Winning to Bid 
Ratio
-0.203* (0.033) -0.200* (0.033) -0.205* (0.033)
Utilization Rate 0.052* (0.014) 0.054* (0.014) 0.058* (0.013)
Log Real Value of Monthly 
Total of Engineering Estimates
0.006 (0.007) 0.006 (0.007)
Monthly Number of Firms per 
Project
0.008 (0.009) 0.007 (0.009)
Project Concentration Ratio -0.077 (0.071) -0.077 (0.071)
Unemployment -0.012 (0.007) -0.012 (0.007)
Sigma
Constant 0.285* (0.021) 0.287* (0.021) 0.285* (0.021)
Info-2a 0.000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.017)
Info-2b -0.034* (0.013) -0.034* (0.012) -0.034* (0.012)
Log of Number of Bids 0.001 (0.014) -0.001 (0.014) 0.001 (0.014)
Number of Observations 5092 5092 5092
Wald χ2 377.86 452.82 360.82
Log Likelihood -594.325 -584.341 -597.457
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Table 3.4:  Relative Winning Bid Regressions for Three Specifications     
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.670* (0.196) 0.673* (0.196) 1.108* (0.039)
Info-2a -0.049* (0.020) -0.051* (0.018)
Info-2b -0.040* (0.013) -0.046* (0.012)
Info-1 LF 0.005 (0.015)
Info-2a SF -0.059* (0.028)
Info-2a LF -0.024 (0.022)
Info-2b SF -0.035 (0.020)
Info-2b LF -0.043* (0.016)
Project-1 -0.025 (0.034) -0.025 (0.034) -0.026 (0.034)
Project-2 -0.174* (0.063) -0.174* (0.063) -0.178* (0.063)
Project-3 -0.030 (0.035) -0.028 (0.035) -0.031 (0.035)
Project-4 -0.025 (0.036) -0.024 (0.036) -0.021 (0.036)
Project-5 0.201* (0.063) 0.201* (0.063) 0.192* (0.062)
Project-6 -0.051 (0.037) -0.049 (0.037) -0.049 (0.037)
Large  Projects -0.026 (0.015) -0.028 (0.016) -0.020 (0.015)
Federal  Projects -0.010 (0.015) -0.010 (0.015) -0.011 (0.015)
Log of Number of Bids -0.074* (0.010) -0.074* (0.010) -0.073* (0.010)
Rivals’ Previous Winning to 
Plan Holder Ratio 
-0.222* (0.081) -0.225* (0.081) -0.228* (0.082)
Firms’ Own Winning to Bid 
Ratio
-0.009 (0.039) -0.007 (0.039) -0.008 (0.038)
Utilization Rate 0.064* (0.021) 0.061* (0.022) 0.061* (0.021)
Log Real Value of Monthly 
Total of Engineering Estimates
0.023* (0.009) 0.023* (0.009)
Monthly Number of Firms per 
Project
0.029* (0.013) 0.029* (0.013)
Project Concentration Ratio -0.161 (0.099) -0.165 (0.099)
Unemployment 0.001 (0.010) 0.001 (0.010)
Sigma 
Constant 0.169* (0.018) 0.169* (0.018) 0.171* (0.018)
Info-2a 0.014 (0.018) 0.014 (0.018) 0.012 (0.018)
Info-2b 0.026 (0.025) 0.026 (0.025) 0.027 (0.025)
Log of Number of Bids 0.024 (0.015) 0.023 (0.016) 0.022 (0.015)
Number of Observations 1426 1426 1426
Wald χ2 189.07 200.18 160.82
Log Likelihood 231.486 232.154 226.550
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Weighted Relative Winning 
Bid 
Constant 1.453* (0.159) 1.072* (0.269)
Info-2a -0.028 (0.015) -0.032 (0.026)
Info-2b -0.099* (0.010) -0.074* (0.018)
Project-1 -0.005 (0.027) 0.059 (0.047)
Project-2 -0.028 (0.051) -0.127* (0.059)
Project-3 -0.025 (0.027) 0.028 (0.046)
Project-4 -0.051 (0.027) 0.029 (0.047)
Project-5 0.183* (0.065) 0.191* (0.059)
Project-6 -0.052 (0.037) 0.034 (0.057)
Large  Projects -0.061* (0.010) -0.034* (0.016)
Federal Projects 0.024* (0.010) 0.025 (0.016)
Log of Number of Bids -0.015 (0.010) -0.052* (0.013)
Rivals’ Previous Winning to Plan Holder 
Ratio 
-0.062 (0.089) -0.120 (0.119)
Firms’ Own Winning to Bid Ratio -0.092* (0.032) -0.088 (0.047)
Utilization Rate 0.047* (0.017) 0.062* (0.025)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of 
Engineering Estimates
-0.011 (0.008) 0.000 (0.014)
Monthly Number of Firms per Project 0.005 (0.009) 0.012 (0.016)
project Concentration Ratio 0.015 (0.078) -0.038 (0.117)
Unemployment -0.031* (0.006) -0.016 (0.011)
Sigma
Constant 0.188* (0.010) 0.125* (0.014)
Info-2a -0.011 (0.010) 0.005 (0.017)
Info-2b -0.028* (0.006) -0.004 (0.011)
Log of Number of Bids -0.014* (0.006) -0.002 (0.009)
Number of Observations 5092 1426
Wald χ2 418.69 141.07
Log Likelihood 3.751e+10 1237e+09
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Constant 1.228* (0.134) 0.710* (0.196) 1.085* (0.229)
Info-2a -0.035* (0.015) -0.033 (0.020) -0.018 (0.022)
Info-2b -0.066* (0.009) -0.039* (0.013) -0.063* (0.015)
Project-1 -0.110* (0.028) -0.023 (0.035) 0.058 (0.044)
Project-2 -0.071 (0.046) -0.186 (0.063) -0.137* (0.055)
Project-3 -0.080* (0.029) -0.041 (0.038) 0.025 (0.043)
Project-4 -0.112* (0.028) -0.022 (0.036) 0.038 (0.042)
Project-5 0.158* (0.064) 0.188* (0.065) 0.131* (0.064)
Project-6 -0.147* (0.038) -0.064 (0.045) 0.047 (0.062)
Large  Projects -0.083* (0.010) -0.032* (0.016) -0.045* (0.017)
Federal Projects -0.022* (0.010) -0.016 (0.015) 0.028 (0.015)
Log of Number of Bids -0.014 (0.008) -0.069* (0.010) -0.050* (0.014)
Rivals’ Previous Winning to 
Plan Holder Ratio 
-0.035 (0.074) -0.268* (0.091) -0.171 (0.120)
Firms’ Own Winning to Bid 
Ratio
-0.066 (0.047) 0.098 (0.054) 0.046 (0.050)
Utilization Rate 0.025 (0.015) 0.036 (0.024) 0.024 (0.027)
Log Real Value of Monthly 
Total of Engineering Estimates
0.005 (0.006) 0.020* (0.009) -0.002 (0.012)
Monthly Number of Firms per 
Project
0.004 (0.009) 0.024 (0.013) 0.008 (0.015)
Project Concentration Ratio -0.073 (0.070) -0.113 (0.098) -0.132 (0.108)
Unemployment -0.014* (0.007) -0.002 (0.009) -0.016 (0.010)
Sigma 
Constant 0.277* 0.021 0.014* (0.017) 0.130* (0.013)
Info-2a      0.005 0.018 0.031 (0.027) -0.005 (0.021)
Info-2b -0.033* 0.013 0.013 (0.017) -0.010 (0.011)
Log of Number of Bids      0.003 0.014 0.014 (0.017) -0.009 (0.009)
Number of Observations 5092 1426 1426
Wald χ2 621.05 325.81 541.92
Log Likelihood -518.97 283.903 1.386e+09
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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with Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Constant 0.309* (0.098) 0.080 (0.085) 0.056 (0.085)
Info-2a 0.019* (0.008) 0.003 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009)
Info-2b 0.012* (0.005) 0.006 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005)
Project-1 -0.031* (0.012) -0.048* (0.018) -0.044* (0.017)
Project-2 0.078* (0.027) 0.015 (0.025) 0.013 (0.024)
Project-3 -0.018 (0.012) -0.054* (0.017) -0.049* (0.017)
Project-4 -0.035* (0.013) -0.064* (0.017) -0.062* (0.016)
Project-5 -0.117* (0.023) -0.083* (0.018) -0.059* (0.021)
Project-6 -0.030* (0.014) -0.052* (0.020) -0.053* (0.021)
Large  Projects 0.000 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
Federal Projects 0.002 (0.006) -0.008 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005)
Log of Number of Bids -0.017* (0.006) -0.019* (0.005) -0.020* (0.005)
Rivals’ Previous Winning to 
Plan Holder Ratio 
0.055 (0.038) -0.060 (0.051) -0.054 (0.048)
Firms’ Own Winning to Bid 
Ratio 0.023 (0.017) 0.005 (0.019) -0.039 (0.025)
Utilization Rate -0.035* (0.010) -0.020* (0.009) -0.012 (0.010)
Log Real Value of Monthly 
Total of Engineering Estimates
-0.010* (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004)
Monthly Number of Firms per 
Project
-0.017* (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005)
Project Concentration Ratio 0.068 (0.041) -0.005 (0.035) 0.012 (0.040)
Unemployment -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004)
Sigma
Constant 0.114* (0.011) 0.078* (0.006) 0.077* (0.007)
Info-2a 0.005 (0.011) -0.001 (0.007) 0.000 (0.009)
Info-2b -0.001 (0.009) 0.000 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005)
Log of Number of Bids -0.023* (0.008) -0.022* (0.004) -0.023* (0.005)
Number of Observations 1426 1426 1426
Wald χ2 120.77 75.01 672.39
Log Likelihood 1443.195 2.986e+09 3.087e+09
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Number of Auctions 4088 1968 2120
Number of Plan Holders 27422 12844 14598
Number of Firms 1110 712 831








Number of Bids 16685 7426 9259






















Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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Relative Winning Bid 
Constant 1.361* (0.092) 1.049* (0.134)
OK-Info-1 -0.042* (0.011) -0.035* (0.016)
OK-Info-2a -0.075* (0.016) -0.079* (0.023)
OK-Info-2b -0.129* (0.012) -0.093* (0.018)
TX-Info-2a -0.027* (0.005) -0.032* (0.008)
TX-Info-2b -0.034* (0.004) -0.038* (0.007)
Project-1 -0.022* (0.006) 0.020* (0.008)
Project-2 -0.021 (0.026) -0.078 (0.041)
Project-3 -0.014* (0.006) 0.022* (0.009)
Project-4 0.001 (0.007) 0.045* (0.011)
Project-5 -0.065* (0.010) -0.030* (0.015)
Project-6 -0.045* (0.007) -0.006 (0.010)
Large  Projects -0.090* (0.004) -0.041* (0.005)
Federal Projects 0.037* (0.003) 0.033* (0.005)
Log of Number of Bids -0.044* (0.004) -0.097* (0.005)
Rivals’ Previous Winning to Plan Holder 
Ratio 
-0.194* (0.033) -0.261* (0.043)
Firms’ Own Winning to Bid Ratio -0.181* (0.012) -0.068* (0.016)
Utilization Rate 0.024* (0.005) 0.016 (0.009)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of 
Engineering Estimates
-0.004     (0.004) 0.007 (0.006)
Monthly Number of Firms per Project -0.010* (0.004) -0.005 (0.005)
Concentration Ratio 0.089* (0.037) 0.034 (0.055)
Unemployment 0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.004)
Sigma
Constant 0.232* (0.007) 0.193* (0.008)
OK-Info-1 0.070* (0.009) 0.039* (0.011)
OK-Info-2a 0.070* (0.016) 0.049* (0.016)
OK-Info-2b 0.025* (0.009) 0.028* (0.011)
TX-Info-2a 0.001 (0.006) -0.003 (0.010)
TX-Info-2b -0.005 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006)
Log of Number of Bids -0.008 (0.004) -0.021* (0.006)
Number of Observations 21743 5486
Wald χ2 1655.28 774.03
Log Likelihood 1111.303 1853.693
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Relative Winning Bid 
Constant 1.353* (0.086) 1.059* (0.127)
OK-Info-1 -0.042* (0.010) -0.034* (0.015)
OK-Info-2a -0.074* (0.015) -0.075* (0.021)
OK-Info-2b -0.130* (0.011) -0.094* (0.017)
TX-Info-2a -0.028* (0.005) -0.033* (0.008) 
TX-Info-2b -0.035* (0.004) -0.038* (0.006)
Project-1 -0.021* (0.005) 0.018* (0.008)
Project-2 -0.030 (0.025) -0.082* (0.039)
Project-3 -0.014* (0.006) 0.020* (0.009)
Project-4 -0.001 (0.006) 0.040* (0.010)
Project-5 -0.064* (0.010) -0.031* (0.014)
Project-6 -0.042* (0.007) -0.007 (0.010)
Large  Projects -0.088* (0.004) -0.040* (0.005)
Federal Projects 0.037* (0.003) 0.034* (0.005)
Log of Number of Bids -0.044* (0.004) -0.095* (0.005)
Rivals’ Previous Winning to Plan Holder 
Ratio 
-0.196* (0.031) -0.258* (0.041)
Firms’ Own Winning to Bid Ratio -0.182* (0.012) -0.070* (0.015)
Utilization Rate 0.024* (0.005) 0.016 (0.008)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of 
Engineering Estimates
-0.003 (0.004) 0.006 (0.006) 
Monthly Number of Firms per Project -0.009* (0.003) -0.005 (0.005) 
Concentration Ratio 0.090* (0.035) 0.041 (0.053)
Unemployment 0.002 (0.003) -0.000 (0.004)
Sigma
Constant 0.229* (0.007) 0.190* (0.008)
OK-Info-1 0.061* (0.008) 0.031* (0.010)
OK-Info-2a 0.060* (0.015) 0.044* (0.016)
OK-Info-2b 0.019* (0.008) 0.024* (0.010)
TX-Info-2a 0.002 (0.006) -0.002 (0.010)
TX-Info-2b -0.004 (0.005) -0.003 (0.006)
Log of Number of Bids -0.009* (0.004) -0.021* (0.008)
Number of Observations 21743 5486
Wald χ2 1768.22 813.47
Log Likelihood 24781.272 27153.707
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Chapter 4
An Empirical Study of the Release of Information in Repeated Procurement 
Auctions
4.1. Introduction
This study empirically investigates the impact of information release on bidding 
behavior in procurement auctions.  The situation that I am studying here concerns the re-
auctioning off of items that failed to be successfully auctioned off in an initial auction.  
For example, in highway construction auctions a project may fail to be auctioned off 
because the state rejects the submitted bids as not meeting the reserve price or because 
there were no bids submitted at the auction.  The state often re-auctions off these projects 
in a later auction.  In such a circumstance, a great deal of information is released to 
potential bidders about the specific auction that may be used in the later round.  In 
Oklahoma, the bids of the unsuccessful bidders are revealed, as is the state’s estimate of 
the costs of the project.  This information is available to potential bidders when the 
project is re-auctioned off in a subsequent letting.  In this study, I investigate how the 
release of this type of information impacts the average bid and the variance of bids in 
highway procurement auctions in Oklahoma.
In this study, I consider the release of information by the state about the project’s 
costs and the rivals’ bidding behavior.   Milgrom and Weber (1982) consider auctions 
with affiliated values and show that, in first price auctions, a policy of revealing the 
seller’s information cannot lower and in fact it may raise the expected price.  In this 
study, I examine whether the information released from the initial round rejected auctions 
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results in more aggressive bidding.  In a related paper, Goeree and Offerman (1999, 
2003) develop a model where the objects that are auctioned off have both private and 
common value characteristics.  In that case, the public disclosure of the auctioneer’s 
information increases expected revenue.  By releasing information, the auctioneer 
reduces uncertainty in the auction.  
The empirical literature on auctions that examines the effect of the release of 
information by the seller is more limited in scope.  Using experimental methods, Kagel, 
Harstad and Levin (1987), find that the release of information raises the seller’s revenues. 
In a repeated auction setting, bidders are provided with some information prior to each 
auction period about the true value of the object being auctioned off. They conclude that 
an increase in the observed average revenue corresponds to the availability of public 
information to the bidders.  Other empirical research has examined asymmetries in 
information available to bidders and asymmetries in costs across bidders in a range of 
auction settings.   For example, papers by Bajari and Ye (2002) and Jofre-Bonet and 
Pesendorfer (2000) examine how differences in rival costs affect bidding behavior.  
These papers find that as rivals’ project backlogs increase or as rivals’ distance to 
projects increase (both presumed to increase rivals’ costs) bidders bid less aggressively.   
In common value settings, the role of asymmetries in bidder information has been 
examined with the focus on how asymmetries may affect the “winner’s curse” (Hendicks 
and Porter, 1988).   The nature of information release considered in this paper is quite 
different than that examined in prior work.  Here, I examine how information released by 
the seller regarding their estimate of the cost of performing a project and the release of 
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information about how bidders bid for a project affect subsequent bidding for the project 
when it is re-auctioned.
The data used for this study comes from the Oklahoma Department of 
Transportation (ODOT) procurement auctions.  These auctions are held monthly in the 
form of first-price sealed-bid auctions and the data are available from January 1997 
through March 2002.  For each project, the data set includes information about the date at 
which the auction was held, a list of all firms that purchased the plans, a list of bids 
received, the states engineering cost estimate, and a detailed description of the project.  I 
use a sub sample of the entire data set that includes all auctions, which were not awarded 
the first time around and were re-auctioned off in a later round.  This allows to compare 
the bidding in the first round (where the information available to bidders is more limited) 
to the bidding behavior in the second round where bidders know more about their 
potential rivals’ valuation of the project and about how the state values the project.   In 
addition, the data allow us to make one additional comparison.  In the middle of the data 
set, the state changed its policy related to the release of the engineering cost estimate.  
Beginning in early 2000, the state began releasing the engineering cost estimate to the 
general contractors association before the bid letting.  Thus, I can also compare the 
bidding behavior of firms in first round auctions before and after the change in this 
policy, as well.
The chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 describes the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature.  Section 4.3 discusses the data set and presents summary 
statistics of the auctions under study.  Section 4.4 presents the results of the empirical 
analysis.  Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2. Literature Review
4.2.1. Empirical work on sequential auctions  
Hendricks and Porter (1988) analyze data from OCS oil lease auctions from 1959 
to 1969.  In these auctions, informational asymmetries exist between bidders who are 
already engaged in drilling activities on neighboring tracts and the non-neighboring firms 
who obtain their information through their own surveys. They find that the bidding 
strategies of these two bidder groups are consistent with the predictions of the Bayesian –
Nash equilibrium model of bidding in first-price sealed-bid auctions.  Neighboring firms 
won more than one half of the drainage tracts with a positive net profit.  The average net 
profit for the non-neighboring firms was approximately zero.                  
Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) find experimental evidence in support of a 
theoretical model developed by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in first-price sealed-bid 
auctions with affiliated values.  The model predicts that revealing public information 
raises expected revenues.  Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) adopt a dual market 
procedure by allowing bidders to bid for the same object twice.  After observing the bids 
from an initial auction and before re-auctioning off the same items, they reveal either 
partial or full information that help bidders to guess the true value of the object.  Then 
bidders are asked to bid again for the same objects.  Bids are revealed under both market 
designs separately at the conclusion of both auction periods. They find that the release of 
public information brings about an increase in revenue which is consistent with the 
predictions of a risk averse Nash equilibrium bidding model.
De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002) study procurement auctions in the 
state of Oklahoma.  These auctions are held in two sessions every month, one session is 
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held in the morning and another in the afternoon.  Bidders in the afternoon auctions can 
take into account the information released during the morning session.  In particular, this 
study focuses on the bidding behavior in the afternoon sessions of winners and losers of 
the auctions that took place in the morning.  In this framework, bidders can bid for more 
than one project.  This allows winners and losers from the morning session to participate 
again in the afternoon session.  Therefore, the asymmetry among bidders in the afternoon
session is due to the differences in the opportunity cost of completing a contract between 
winners and losers.   They find that firms that won in the morning bid more aggressively 
in the afternoon.  Also, firms that lost in the morning bid aggressively relative to their 
morning bids.     
In a related study following the theoretical predictions from Maskin and Riley 
(2000), De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2003) examine the bidder asymmetry that 
could be attributed to experience in construction contracts using the data from ODOT.  
Bidder asymmetry could arise due to inexperience in these projects and lack of 
confidence about the cost estimates.  This is a different flavor of information compared to 
seller information addressed by other studies.  They identify two types of bidder groups, 
incumbents and entrants based on their experience.  They find that entrants’ cost 
dispersion is larger than incumbents and that entrants bid more aggressively than 
incumbents and leave more money on the table.  
4.2.2. Theoretical evidence of impact of information in sequential auctions
Milgrom and Weber (1982) considered auctions with affiliated values and show 
that, in first price auctions, a policy of revealing the seller’s information cannot lower, 
and may raise the expected price.
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Thomas (1996) develops a model to analyze the effect of the public release of 
seller information on bidding behavior.    He focuses on the amount of information shared 
between the auctioneer (such as a distributor) and the bidders (such as the
manufacturers).  In this framework, bidders are demanding multiple objects and their 
values are correlated. He compares the policy of fully revealing information (the winning 
bid and all other bids), against a policy where bidders are allowed to see only the identity 
of the winner ex post.  He finds that when more information is released it raises expected 
profits to the seller and increases competition among the bidders which is consistent with 
the existing theory.
Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) develop a model where the objects that are 
auctioned off have both private and common value characteristics.  In this case, the 
public disclosure of the auctioneer’s information increases expected revenue. They also 
show that more uncertainty about the common value reflects higher levels of inefficiency.  
They find that the profit of the winning bidder is higher with greater uncertainty since 
bidders want to avoid the winner’s curse and bid more cautiously.  On the other hand, 
with less uncertainty bidding is more aggressive. 
4.3. Data
4.3.1. Repeating Auctions
This study utilizes data from ODOT highway procurement auctions.  These 
auctions are carried out monthly and are first-price sealed-bid auctions where the lowest 
bidder is awarded the contract.  The study uses data from January 1997 to March 2002 
and focuses on a specific set of construction projects.  The specific construction projects 
under study are projects that fail to be auctioned off in an initial auction and are 
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subsequently placed up for auction in a later bid letting.  There are several reasons, as to 
why these auctions have not been awarded in the first round.  First, ODOT has a reserve 
rule that allows it to reject the lowest bid if it exceeds ODOT's engineering estimate by 
more than seven percent.  Second, in some auctions there are no bids submitted by any of 
the contractors.  In this case, the state often resubmits the project in a later auction.  The 
third reason could be due to submission of unbalanced bids by contractors.  In this case, 
while the lowest bid may meet reserve requirements, the composition of the bids on the 
underlying project components may not have met state requirements. 33  These are the 
major reasons for not awarding contracts.  
Overall, the data include 146 construction projects that were not successfully 
auctioned off in the first round and were subsequently re-auctioned off. These initial 
auctions are identified as R1 auctions.  The corresponding second round auctions are 
identified as R2 auctions.  Of the 146 R1 auctions, 119 were awarded in the second round 
while 10 construction projects were auctioned off for a third time and these are denoted 
R3.  From these R3 auctions, 9 auctions have been awarded and one project was auctioned 
off in the fourth round R4.  Of the initial 146 projects offered for re-bidding, 16 were not 
awarded during the time period of analysis.  Table 4.1 summarizes these auction statistics 
for each bidding round.  The table reports the number of auctions, the average number of 
plan holders per auction,34 the average number of bidders per auction, number of auctions 
with bidders and the number of awarded auctions.  In addition, the table provides some 
33 If the cost components of the bid significantly deviate from the cost components of ODOT’s engineering 
estimate the bid is known as an unbalanced bid.  Unbalanced bids may be rejected even when a bid is lower 
than the engineering estimate. 
34 Firms that are willing to bid in a given project can obtain a project plan from ODOT which contains a 
detailed description about the project.  All firms that bid in these auctions are required to purchase the 
project plan from ODOT.  However all plan holders are not necessarily bidders. 
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population statistics for comparison purposes.  Overall, the data show that in the initial 
round the average number of bidders per auction is quite low both compared to the 
population total and to the average number of bidders in later rounds.  
Table 4.2 presents data on the relative bids in the initial auctions, “repeated” 
auctions and for non-repeated auctions over the time period of analysis. The relative bid 
is measured as the bid divided by the engineering cost estimate and it allows for the 
comparison of bids across auctions since it normalizes each auction by an auction 
specific estimate of cost. The first two rows present the average relative bid and the 
average relative low bid respectively for the sample of “repeated” auctions.   The next 
two rows present the same information but for all other highway auctions let during the 
same period.  The data show in the first round of the repeating auctions (R1) on average 
bids are 32 percent higher than the engineering estimate.  In the second and third rounds 
they are 19 percent above the engineering estimate.  
4.3.2. Classification of Auction Information
The sample design allows for the classification of auctions based on differences in 
the information available to auction participants. There are two main distinctions made 
with regards to information release.  The first main distinction is made as to whether an 
auction is a first round or a subsequent round auction (R2, R3, or R4).  Participants in the 
subsequent rounds can observe what happened in the initial auction.  This information 
includes the engineering cost estimate of the state, the number of plan holders and 
bidders, the list of submitted bids and the rejected low bid (if bids were submitted).  The 
second main distinction deals with when the auction takes place.  ODOT changed its 
policy regarding the release of the state’s engineering cost estimate early in 2000 
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resulting in the engineering estimate being made available to potential bidders before the 
bid letting.  Thus, after January 2000, bidders have access to the state’s engineering cost 
estimate prior to the bid letting.   However, note that after January 2000, initial round 
bidders still do not have all the information that later round bidders have.  Bidders in 
subsequent rounds see the rejected bids and the participation decisions of potential rivals 
from the first round.  Using these two pieces of information I classify auctions into four 
broad information groups – (1) first round auctions where the state engineering estimates 
are not known, (2) first round auctions with knowledge of the state engineering estimate, 
(3) subsequent round auctions with knowledge of the prior round bidding behavior and 
the state’s estimate of the project cost in the prior round; and (4) subsequent round 
auctions with knowledge of the state’s current engineering estimate and of prior round 
bidding action.   
In addition to these broad classifications of available information, measures are 
constructed based on the specific outcome of the prior round auction.  It is likely that 
bidders in subsequent rounds will be influenced by participation patterns and the 
aggressiveness of bidding in the first round.  To that end, I distinguish between three 
outcomes depending upon the bidding patterns in the first round.  First, if the previous 
round lowest bidder bid lower than seven percent of the engineering estimate (the stated 
reserve price), I group these auctions together (denoted as I1).  These are auctions that 
were rejected for a reason other than a failure to receive a bid that met the reserve bid.  
This is most likely due to the fact that the low bid was “unbalanced”.  Second, if the 
previous round lowest bid was above the reserve bid, then these are auctions likely 
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rejected because the low bid did not meet the reserve price (denoted as I2).  Finally, if 
there were no bids submitted in the previous round, I denote these auctions as I3.  
The final measurement issue I address concerns the information content of the 
engineering cost estimate released in the first round.  When the state re-auctions off a 
project, it often changes the engineering cost estimate (45% of the time).  It may raise, 
keep the same, or even lower the cost estimate in the subsequent rounds.  The prior round 
engineering estimate is thus a noisy signal of the current engineering estimate for all 
auctions that occur prior to January 2000 (before the state began releasing the current 
estimate).  One way, bidders may identify whether the state is likely to change the 
estimate is to look at whether there are changes in the project descriptions or changes in 
work/composition lists that accompany each project.  In general, these changes to the 
projects are not major changes that would mutate the project into an effectively new 
project.  I make sure the projects are in the same location and are for similar kinds of 
work.  To control for these changes in the analysis below, I simply classify all projects 
depending upon whether there are changes to the project (denoted as S2) or not (denoted 
as S1) – a zero-one variable.
The classification scheme allows for a rich set of interactions based on the 
information available to bidders.  For initial round auctions the classification scheme is 
simple, auctions that occur before January 2000 and auctions that occur after January 
2000.  Hence, there are only two types of initial round auctions.  For the subsequent 
auctions the interactions are more complex and are illustrated in Figure 4.1.  Figure 4.1 
groups the data into two time periods, three groups that describe the bidding in the 
previous round, and two groups that describe whether the re-auctioned off project is the 
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same in description or differs somewhat.  This classification scheme defines twelve 
(2x3x2) possible auction information states based on prior auction information and 
changes in the information released by the state.
4.3.3. Regression Variables
Besides the auction information variables and the relative bid data that have been 
described above, I also construct a number of control variables that will be used in the 
estimation procedure that follows.   The variables can be broadly classified into three 
groups of control variables -- project characteristics, bidder characteristics and rival 
characteristics.  
The project characteristics include measures of project size, project type, whether 
the project is under Federal or State financing, and the number of plan holders.  To 
measure the overall size of the project, I use the state’s engineering estimate.  I include a 
dummy variable to indicate projects whose value exceeds $1 million.  I include this 
variable because larger projects are different in complexity and work requirements (e.g., 
large projects are more likely to be subject to disadvantaged business programs 
requirements).  Also, I distinguish between projects that have federal funding vs. state 
only funding.  These projects will be subject to federal guidelines.35 If a project has 
federal funding, this dummy variable (FEDST) is set equal to one.   As in the previous 
literature, I control for the number of bidders.  Since, the actual number of participants 
may be endogenous (Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter, 2001), I proxy the potential 
competition in the auction by the number of plan holders.  In Oklahoma, only firms 
35 For example the main contractor is responsible to avoid any discrimination among the sub contractors in 
terms of residence requirements for labor, in terms of segregated facilities (separate dinning areas, rest 
rooms etc.) and alike.  Main contractor must provide equal opportunity to disadvantaged business groups to 
compete and undertake sub contracts.
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buying plans may bid in an auction and the plan holder list is made available to bidders 
prior to the auction.  Thus, the number of plan holders, acts as upper bound on the actual 
number of bidders in an auction.  Finally, I control broadly for the type of project being 
auctioned.  Projects are classified into seven different categories -- including asphalt 
paving, clearance and bank protection, bridgework, grading and draining, concrete work, 
signals and lighting and miscellaneous work.
To control for differences in bidder efficiency, I employ two variables following 
De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003) that measure bidder performance.36
First, I look at a firm’s success in previous auctions.  For each firm, a winning to bid ratio 
is constructed that measures the winning percentage of the firm in past auctions 
(WINRATIO).  This variable should proxy well for differences in firm efficiencies. 
Second, a variable that measures the backlog (BACKLOG) of projects a firm under 
contract is constructed.  Previous papers by Porter and Zona (1993), Jofre-Bonet and 
Pesendorfer (2000), and Bajari and Ye (2002) have used the backlog variable to proxy for 
capacity constraints facing bidders.  It is argued that as the backlog rises a firm will bid 
less aggressively.  A variable is also constructed to control for the “toughness” of rivals 
that a firm faces in an auction.  For each bidder, the set of potential rivals is provided by 
the plan holder list for an auction.  For each rival on the plan holder list, the ratio of 
rival’s past winning to plans held is constructed.  This variable summarizes the likelihood 
that a rival bids and wins in an auction where “tough” rivals would have high winning 
percentages in previous auctions.  I then average this variable over all rivals in an auction 
to create a rival toughness variable (RIVAL).                            
36   Project type variables and backlog variable are the same variables that were used in De Silva Dunne and 
Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003) and I thank the authors for allowing me to use those variables in the current 
study.  
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The final variable I construct attempts to control for differences in the total 
amount of project value auctioned off in a month.  Over the entire time period I 
examined, the dollar value of contracts awarded fluctuated.  In particular, the dollar value 
of projects awarded falls as the Oklahoma economy and the state budget worsened in 
2001 and 2002.   Hence, I included a variable that measures the real dollar value of all 
projects let in each month.  This should control for differences in bidding that may be due 
to differences in the number and value of projects that occur over time.
4.4. Estimation and Results
In this section, I present the results of the empirical model that examines the 
relationship between bidding behavior and information asymmetries across auctions.  My 
goal is to see how differences in the information available to bidders affect the mean and 
variance of bids.   I start by specifying a simple reduced-form bidding model.37  The 
dependent variable in all the regressions is the relative bid and it is modeled as a function 
of auction specific information variables, project characteristics, bidder characteristics, 






























The error structure of the model takes the following form:
εi   ~  N(0, σi2 )
where σi is modeled as 
37 There are 13 auction specific information variables in the model according to above classification.  Out 
of these, three variables (RT1I1S2, RT1I3S2, and RT2I3S2) did not have any observations and was not 
included in the regression.  Therefore total number of coefficients estimated in the mean equation is 23 
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The first three terms in the relative bid (Rbid) equation characterize the 
information differences across auctions.  The omitted group, represented by the intercept, 
is all first round auctions where the state engineering estimate is not known.  The second 
term represents first round auctions where the state engineering estimate is known.  The 
third term represents 12 dummy variables that measure differences in information 
available to second round bidders.  These correspond to classification system described in 
Figure 4.1.  The remaining variables describe auction characteristics (project dummies, 
bigest, fedst, lnph), bidder characteristics (winratio, lbacklog), rival characteristics (rival) 
and a control for the amount of projects auctioned off in a month (lrallet).  Summary 
statistics of the variables used in the estimation are presented in Table 4.3.
σi is also allowed to vary with the variables the measure differences in 
information release across auctions.  The motivation for this modeling of the standard 
deviation equation (sigma) comes from the theory that suggests that the release of 
information should reduce the uncertainty about the value of the object (Goeree and 
Offerman, 2003) and hence may impact the variance of bids.  The model was estimated 
using the maximum likelihood estimation procedures.
Before I present the individual coefficient estimates, I test a number of restrictions 
regarding the information variables to see if the interaction terms can be simplified.  
These are presented in Table 4.4.  The first row presents the results of a likelihood ratio 
test of whether the same and different classification scheme matters.  The test rejects the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two groups of auctions and the 
restrictions are imposed on both the mean and variance components of the model.  The 
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next row examines whether there is a difference in bidding between the periods when the 
information regarding the state engineering cost estimate available to bidders and when it 
is not.  The test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no difference between bidding 
between the two time periods. The last row of the table reports the test of whether 
bidding in later round auctions depends on the level of the observed bidding in the 
previous auction. Again, the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference in bidding among auctions with different levels of rejected previous round 
low bids.  The conclusion here is that the interaction terms in the regression equation 
cannot be estimated in a more parsimonious fashion.
The regression results are presented in Table 4.5.  The top half of the table reports 
the coefficients from the regression of the mean of the relative bid and the bottom half 
reports the coefficients from the standard deviation equation.  The first group of 
coefficients represents the information variables.  Note that while there are 12 possible 
interactions only nine occur in the data.  First, the coefficients on the information are all 
negative indicating more aggressive bidding in subsequent rounds as compared to the 
first round auctions.  However, note that the observation of simply lower bids in the 
subsequent rounds is not a test of the theory -- as one would expect this pattern because 
of the states application of the reserve rule.  The bid levels and variance must differ 
systematically by the information available in the subsequent auctions.  Second, it is also 
not surprising that the most aggressive bidding occurs in auctions that had relatively 
aggressive bidding in the first round (I1 auctions).  Though, it appears that there is little 
difference in the aggressiveness of bidding between I1 auctions and I3 auctions.  Third, 
there does not appear to be a strong pattern in the coefficients due to whether the project 
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description changed (S1 versus S2 auctions). However, recall the likelihood ratio test 
indicates that there is a statistical difference between these auction types.  Examining the 
effect of information on the variance, no strong patterns emerge across different groups 
of information variables.  In fact, I generally see a rise in the variance of bids after the 
release of the engineering cost estimate.  This pattern does not support the notion that 
increases in this type of information reduce the variance of bids.   In general, the results 
do not indicate a strong role for these types of information differences as affecting 
auction outcomes.    
Of the remaining variables in the model, only the project variables and the 
variable that measures project size are statistically significant at the 5% level.  With 
respect to the project size variable, larger projects have more aggressive bidding than 
smaller projects.         
4.5. Conclusion
This study investigates bidding behavior in auctions where there is a substantial 
release of information prior to the auction letting.  In general, I find little systematic 
correlation between the release of information and the aggressiveness of bidding or the 
variance of bids.  An overall view of what is happening in these auctions can be seen in 
Figure 4.2.  Figure 4.2 presents the kernel density for the distribution of relative bids for 
three samples of firms – R1 Auctions, R234 Auctions (repeated auctions), and all non-
repeating auctions.  The later group of auctions has not been used in the regression 
analysis presented above.  Comparing these groups of auctions, this study shows that 
there is a substantial difference in the mean of R1 auctions (the rightmost distribution) 
and it appears that there is greater dispersion, reflected especially in the shape of upper 
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tail.  The R234 distribution is shifted left (reflecting the lower bids) and the spread appears 
to be reduced.  This pattern generally agrees with the priors about information release.  
However, the empirical work was unable to make the link between information release 
and the reduction in variance and the reduction in average bids.   Finally, note that while 
the mean of the R234 auction distribution is lower than the R1 auction it remains above the 
mean of the auction that are successfully auctioned off in the first round.  This suggests 
that there remains a systematic difference between these auctions (R234) and auctions 
successfully auctioned off in the first round.    
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Figure 4.2: Kernel Density of Relative Bid Distribution of Auctions not Repeating (Left 
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Table 4.1:  Summary Statistics of Auctions
Repeating AuctionsFull 
Sample R1 R2 R3 R4
Number of Auctions 2338 146 146 11 1
Number of Plan 
Holders
13132 708 757 58 3
Average Number of 












Number of Bids 7246 232 401 37 2












Number of Auctions 
with Bids
2174 108 139 11 1 
Number of Auctions 
Awarded
1922 0 119 10 1
Number of Auctions 
Not Awarded
419 146 27 1 0
Number of Auctions with a Change in the Engineering Estimate
No change in the     
estimate
79 5 1
Decrease in the 
estimate
17 1 0
Increase in the 
estimate
48 5 0
Total 14438 11 1
Note: Standard deviations are in the parenthesis.
38 The total of these auctions is 144.  Of the total 146 R2 auctions engineering estimate for two previous 
round auctions (R1 auctions) were not available.  Therefore the change in the estimate is unknown.
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Table 4.2:  Mean Relative Bid and Mean of the Low Relative Bid for Repeated 




R1 R2 R3 R4






















Note: Standard deviations are in the parenthesis.
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Table 4.3:  Means of the Regression Variables
Variable Mean       (Std.)
Relative Bid 1.217     (0.289)
R1T1 0.230     (0.421)
R1T2 0.128     (0.334)
RT1I1S1 0.028     (0.165)
RT1I2S1 0.092     (0.289)
RT1I2S2 0.072     (0.259)
RT1I3S1 0.090     (0.286)
RT2I1S1 0.060     (0.238)
RT2I1S2 0.022     (0.147)
RT2I2S1 0.148     (0.355)
RT2I2S2 0.094     (0.292)
RT1I1S1 0.036     (0.186)
Rivals Previous Winning to Plan Holder 
Ratio (RIVAL)
0.140     (0.057)
Large Projects (BIGEST) 0.216     (0.413)
Federal / State Projects (FEDST) 0.643      (0.480)
Firm’s Previous Wining to Bid Ratio 
(WINRATIO)
0.259     (0.147)
Log of the Firm’s Backlog (LBACKLOG) 10.122    (6.537)
Log Number of Plan Holders in an 
Auction (LNPH)
1.521     (0.516)
Log of the Real Value of Monthly 
Engineering Estimate totals for the 
auctions (LRALLET)
17.456    (0.644)
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Table 4.4:  Likelihood Ratio Test Results 
The Null Hypothesis Likelihood Ratio (χ2)
There is no difference between the auctions that 
underwent a change in work/composition and those did 
not (S1 and S2)
30.92*
There is no difference between the auctions that were 
held before January 2000 and after January 2000 (T1 
and T2).
37.67*
There is no difference between the auctions based upon 
previous round outcomes (I1, I2 and I3).
31.47*
* Denotes 5% significance.
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Table 4.5: Relative Bid Regression
Independent Variable 
Constant 1.852*    (0.376)
R1T2 -0.008      (0.054)
RT1I1S1 -0.225*    (0.080)
RT1I2S1 -0.140*    (0.054)
RT1I2S2 -0.168*    (0.035)
RT1I3S1 -0.106*    (0.041)
RT2I1S1 -0.210*    (0.051)
RT2I1S2 -0.092      (0.056)
RT2I2S1 -0.018      (0.044)
RT2I2S2 -0.130*    (0.043)
RT2I3S1 -0.179*    (0.048)
PROJECT-1 0.026      (0.056)
PROJECT-2 0.085      (0.110)
PROJECT-3 -0.056      (0.043)
PROJECT-4 -0.049      (0.051)
PROJECT-5  0.144      (0.096)
PROJECT-6 0.019      (0.072)
Large Projects Dummy(BIGEST) -0.095*    (0.037)
Federal / State Projects (FEDST) 0.029      (0.028)
Rivals Previous Winning to Plan Holder Ratio (RIVAL) -0.007      (0.214)
Firm’s Previous Winning to Bid Ratio (WINRATIO) -0.023      (0.075)
Log Backlog of the Firm (LBACKLOG) 0.0005    (0.002)
Log Number of Plan holders (LNPH) 0.043      (0.030)
Log Real Value of Monthly Project Totals (LRALLET) -0.034**  (0.020)
Sigma
Constant 0.234*    (0.016)
R1T2 0.152*    (0.038)
RT1I1S1 0.046      (0.056)
RT1I2S1 0.084*    (0.038)
RT1I2S2 -0.087*    (0.025)
RT1I3S1 -0.016      (0.029)
RT2I1S1 0.004      (0.036)
RT2I1S2 -0.108*    (0.037)
RT2I2S1 0.075*    (0.032)
RT2I2S2 0.005      (0.030)
RT2I3S1 -0.068*    (0.030)
Number of Observations 500
Wald χ2 82.25
Log Likelihood -21.336
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance and 
** denotes 10% significance.  Omitted group is R1T1.
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R1T1 Initial round auctions (R1 auctions) that were held before January 2000.  
These auctions are not successfully awarded and bidders in these auctions do 
not observe the current engineering estimate.  
R1T2 Initial round auctions (R1 auctions) that were held after January 2000.  These 
auctions are not successfully awarded and bidders in these auctions observe 
the current engineering estimate.  
RT1I1S1 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held before January 
2000, which had a lowest bid below 7% of the engineering estimate in the 
initial round.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) has not 
undergone any changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The 
bidders in these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering 
estimate and do not observe the current estimate.
RT1I1S2 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held before January 
2000, which had a lowest bid below 7% of the engineering estimate in the 
initial round.  The current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auction) different from the 
initial round auction in terms of materials used or work composition.  The 
bidders in these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering 
estimate.  They do not observe the current estimate. 
RT1I2S1 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held before January 
2000, which had a lowest bid above 7% of the engineering estimate in the 
initial round.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auction) has not 
undergone any changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The 
bidders in these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering 
estimate and do not observe the current estimate.
RT1I2S2 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held before January 
2000, which had a lowest bid above 7% of the engineering estimate in the 
initial round.  The current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auction) different from the 
initial round auction in terms of materials used or work composition.  The 
bidders in these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering 
estimate.  They do not observe the current estimate. 
RT1I3S1 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held before January 
2000.  No bids have been submitted in the corresponding initial round 
auction.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auction) has not undergone 
any changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The bidders in 
these auctions do not observe the current engineering estimate.  
75
RT1I3S2 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held before January 
2000.  No bids have been submitted in the corresponding initial round 
auction.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auction) has undergone 
changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The bidders in 
these auctions do not observe the current engineering estimate.  
RT2I1S1 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held after January 
2000, which had a lowest bid below 7% of the engineering estimate in the 
initial round.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) has not 
undergone any changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The 
bidders in these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering 
estimate and observe the current estimate.
RT2I1S2 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held after January 
2000, which had a lowest bid below 7% of the engineering estimate in the
initial round.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) has undergone 
changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The bidders in 
these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering estimate and 
observe the current estimate.
RT2I2S1 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held after January 
2000, which had a lowest bid above 7% of the engineering estimate in the 
initial round.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) has not 
undergone any changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The 
bidders in these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering 
estimate and observe the current estimate.
RT2I2S2 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held after January 
2000, which had a lowest bid above 7% of the engineering estimate in the 
initial round.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) has undergone 
changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The bidders in 
these auctions observe the previous round bids and engineering estimate and 
observe the current estimate.
RT2I3S1 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held after January 
2000.  No bids have been submitted in the corresponding initial round 
auction.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auction) has not undergone 
any changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The bidders in 
these auctions observe the current engineering estimate.  
RT2I3S2 Subsequent auctions (R2, R3, or R4 auctions) that were held after January 
2000.  No bids have been submitted in the corresponding initial round 
auction.  Also the current auction (R2, R3, or R4 auction) has undergone 
changes in terms of materials used or work composition.  The bidders in 
these auctions observe the current engineering estimate.  
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Chapter 5
The Impact of a Change in the Auction Format on Bidding Behavior
5.1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the impact of change in the format of the auctions held 
by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) on the bidding behavior and the 
seller revenue.  Every month ODOT calls sealed-bids from prospective bidders to auction 
off road construction contracts.  Until March of 2002, ODOT auctioned off these 
contracts in two separate sessions on a single day. One session was held in the morning 
and the other in the afternoon. A number of projects were auctioned off simultaneously 
within each session. At the end of the morning session, ODOT revealed all the 
information that was generated in the morning auctions to the bidders. That included the 
names of the winning bidders, winning bids and the bids submitted by other firms.  
Therefore, for those auctions offered in a sequence, interested bidders could take into 
account available information on the bidding behavior of others when submitting their 
bids in the afternoon session. After March 2002, ODOT started auctioning these contracts 
in a single session holding simultaneous first-price auctions.  The auction literature 
suggests that such a change in the auction format can have a significant impact on the 
seller's revenue.  Using ODOT auction data, this study investigates the impact of this 
format change on the bidding behavior and the State's revenues. 
The attempts to compare directly the simultaneous with the sequential auction 
format have been very limited in the theoretical literature. The recent work was 
essentially motivated by the success of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
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in selling its PCS39 licenses in a multi-round auction format in the early 1990's. The 
FCC's primary goal was to promote efficiency. In that effort, a number of auction 
theorists designed a simultaneous multiple round auction format (McMillan, 1994; 
Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996; Moreton and Spiller, 1998).  One of the key reasons for 
this design of auction is to allow bidders to realize synergies that arise due to the 
proximity in the location of those licenses.  Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) point out that 
there was no sufficient theoretical literature to support the FCC’s decision at the time. 
Their theoretical work came later to address issues of revenue in the presence of potential 
synergies. Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) compare the seller revenue across two formats, 
the simultaneous and the sequential auction formats, and find that the revenue is higher in 
simultaneous auctions when the bidders have the potential to realize higher level of 
synergies. In a related study, Rosenthal and Wang (1996) observe higher seller revenue 
when bidders have potentially higher synergies.  Hausch (1986) on the other hand 
compares the seller revenue between the two auction formats without considering 
synergies.  He finds that, in common value auctions, the revenue is higher in sequential 
auctions due to existence of the winner's curse.   
There are no empirical studies that compare directly the seller revenue between 
sequential and simultaneous auctions.  The literature mainly focuses on the effect of 
synergies on the seller's revenues within a single auction format.  Ausubel et al (1997), 
Moreton and Spiller (1998), show that generally, bidders holding adjacent licenses in 
FCC spectrum auctions are willing to bid more aggressively.  Also De Silva (2005) 
39 Personnel Communication Systems (PCS) include portable phones, paging devices etc.  See Moreton and 
Spiller (1998) for details.
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observes aggressive bidding behavior due to the presence of geographic synergies in road 
construction auctions in Oklahoma.  His analysis is restricted in the sequential auction 
format. 
The goal of this study is to examine the relative performance of the sequential and 
simultaneous auction formats in the road construction auctions held in Oklahoma.  The 
empirical analysis of this study captures the potential for some synergies and compares 
the revenue performance between the two auction formats. This study finds a decrease in 
overall bids and in winning bids after the policy change occurred.  However results do 
not support theories developed by Krishna and Rosenthal (1996). 
In the next section I describe the relevant literature to this study.  Section 5.3 and 
5.4 describe the data and empirical analysis respectively.  The results are presented in 
section 5.5 and section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature Review
5.2.1. Theoretical Literature
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) analyze simultaneous second-price sealed-bid 
auction model in an independent private value setting.  Multiple objects are auctioned off
to two types of bidders called local and global bidders.  Local bidders have privately 
known valuation for the object and enjoy no synergies (no increasing returns).  Global 
bidders observe a signal about the value of the object and enjoy synergies.  That is, if a 
global bidder wins two objects, the total value of the objects together is more than the 
sum of the individual values.40  Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) compare revenues between 
simultaneous and sequential auction formats.  The comparison is done with varying 
40 The model assumes that the synergy is always a positive synergy and it is public knowledge.
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levels of synergy and with varying number of global bidders (one and two global 
bidders).  Their results suggest that when global bidders enjoy higher level of synergies, 
the simultaneous auction format generates higher seller revenue than the sequential 
auction format.  The opposite is true with a lower level of synergies, i.e. the sequential 
auction format generates higher seller revenue with lower level of synergies.  Using 
second-price, simultaneous ascending bid auction format Albano, Germano and Lovo 
(2001) compare the revenue performance of simultaneous ascending bid auction41 to 
three other auction formats.  They are sequential auctions, VCG auctions42 and 
simultaneous one-shot auctions.   They use a second-price auction format in a similar 
modeling framework to Krishna and Rosenthal (1996).  They find that the sequential 
auction format performs poorly relative to the two simultaneous auction formats.  
Aggressive bidding behavior in simultaneous auctions is due to exploitation of synergies 
by global bidders. 
Rosenthal and Wang (1996) analyze simultaneous auctions when the objects have 
common values.  They consider a first-price sealed-bid auction format.  Like Krishna and 
Rosenthal (1996) they distinguish between global and local bidders.  They observe 
aggressive bidding behavior among global bidders with a higher level of synergies.  
Hausch (1986) develops a first-price sealed-bid auction model to compare seller 
revenue between sequential and simultaneous auction formats. He considers a two-object 
auction model with common values.  Bidders receive a high or a low signal about the 
value of the object.  He argues that in sequential sales if a high signal bidder mimics the 
41 Bidders can simultaneously submit bids on multiple objects.  Then the auctioneer starts raising the price.  
The authors point out that the format is similar to the Japanese auction for multiple objects.  
42 In VCG auction mechanisms (Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanisms) a bidder's optimal strategy is to 
always submit bids according to his/her true value of the object regardless of the information received from 
others. 
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low signal bidder there will be an overall reduction in the winner’s curse. Therefore on 
average higher seller revenues can be expected in sequential auctions relative to the 
simultaneous auctions when bidders do not reveal their actual values.  However, if 
bidders signal their true values when bidding, he finds that the simultaneous auction 
format performs better in revenue than the sequential format.  Notice that, this study 
draws its conclusions without considering synergies like in other previously discussed 
studies.  The higher revenue from sequential auctions is attributed to the presence of 
winner’s curse. 
Benoit and Krishna (2001) analyze a multiple object, simultaneous English 
auction with budget constrained bidders.  Thus they incorporate strategic behavior which 
is different from previous studies.  The objects have common values but not identical as 
in other common value models.  The budget constraints faced by the bidders and the 
values of the objects are publicly known.  Benoit and Krishna (2001) consider both 
positive synergies (complementary goods) and negative synergies (substitute goods) in 
the model.  This study compares the revenue obtained from simultaneous and optimal 
sequential auction43 formats.  The study shows that the optimal sequential auction
generates higher revenue than the simultaneous format under the following two 
conditions.44  (a) When the value of the two objects is significantly different, and (b) 
when there are large positive synergies (in the case of complementary goods) to the 
bidders.  In ODOT auctions projects are not systematically ordered in a particular way.  
Even though the sequential auction format adopted by ODOT does not match with the 
43 They show that, the optimal sequential auction, of two objects with different values requires that the 
more valuable object is sold first and the less valuable second.   
44 Goeree, Offerman and  Schram (2003) find evidence for higher seller revenue when the objects are sold 
in a decreasing order of quality in a sequential first price auctions compared to the first price simultaneous 
auctions (when the objects are heterogeneous and there is unitary demand for the objects.).   
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optimal sequential auction format used by Benoit and Krishna (2001), theoretical 
evidence like this reflects the complex nature of the revenue comparison between the two 
auction formats.       
Goeree, Plott and Wooders (2003), compare the revenues generated by 
“Ascending right to choose auctions” (ARTC) with the standard simultaneous ascending 
(SA) auctions.  ARTC auctions are commonly used in the sale of real estate auctions 
which is in a sequential format in this study.  In the ARTC format after the winner is 
selected he has the right to choose the preferred item.45  Both ARTC and SA auctions are 
conducted as English auctions in this study and the objects have private values.   This 
study shows that when the bidders are risk averse, selling items via the ARTC auction 
format raises more revenue than simultaneous auction format.  With risk neural bidders 
both auction formats raise the same revenue.  
Feng and Chatterjee (2003) also compare the performance of sequential and 
simultaneous auctions.  They consider a second-price sealed-bid auction in the 
independent private value framework.  Bidders have unit demand and the objects are 
identical.  They compare the revenues between a one period simultaneous format and a 
two period sequential format.  They find that the revenue from the two period auction 
format depends largely on market competition.  They define the intensity of market 
competition in the auction as the number of objects for sale divided by the number of 
bidders.  They show that, if the competition is higher (a lower number of objects for a 
given number of bidders), simultaneous auctions generate more revenues than sequential 
auctions.  When the market is less competitive the sequential format performs better. 
45 Then the remaining bidders bid on the next item.  
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5.2.2. Empirical Literature
Ausubel et al (1997) analyze synergies in PCS auctions.  They identify two types 
of synergies as local and global. This terminology is used differently here than in the 
theoretical work cited above. Local synergies are defined as the synergies that arise from 
holding two or more licenses in adjacent locations.  Global synergies arise from holding 
two or more licenses that are not in adjacent locations.  In particular, this study focuses 
on the effect of local synergies.  This is because local synergies are more likely to give 
rise to the “exposure problem”.46  They point out that when there are two or more bidders 
in an auction who would take advantage of local synergies in a particular area the final 
auction price would reflect the local synergies to the winning bidder and to the second 
highest bidder (marginal bidder). Their results indicate that the variables used to capture 
synergies have a positive and significant impact on the final bidding price.47   Also they 
find that when marginal bidder anticipates synergies it tends to push the price up 
significantly. 
Moreton and Spiller (1998) analyze the synergies in the PCS48 spectrum auctions 
conducted by the FCC.  Synergies arise either by the ownership of adjacent licenses 
(local synergies) or by the ownership of several licenses that are not located adjacently 
(global synergies).  They identify the value of a license using the total network value49 of 
46 If a given bidder bids aggressively in an early auction anticipating to win a subsequent auction and does 
not win, he ends up with an incomplete set of objects.  This adverse outcome is identified as the “exposure 
problem” in the literature.                                                                                                             
47 They include both absolute and relative synergy variables in their models. The potential for synergy is 
identified using a dummy variable.  It is also weighted by the population in the area (which reflects the 
demand for telephones in a given area). See Ausubel et al (1997) for details.
48 At the time this paper was written the FCC included the following devices under PCS: communication 
devices that will include multifunction portable phones and other imaging devices, new types of codeless 
phones and paging devices.     
49 Network value is the total value of all licenses held by a given bidder in adjacently located areas.  
Authors approximate the value of a license by the number of subscribers in the license area, the median 
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the license considering several factors.  Synergies arise from the total value of these 
licenses.  They consider synergies for the winning bidders as well as synergies for the 
second lowest bidder.  Local synergies are measured by the size (number of subscribers) 
of the local wireless network that a bidder holds.  Global synergies occur when bidders 
hold multiple licenses in the nationwide wireless network.  This study is different from 
Ausubel et al (1997) in two ways.  First, Moreton and Spiller (1998) include additional
control variables in their reduced form winning bid regression.  These variables can 
identify the state level regulatory environment, which affects the issuing of these licenses. 
Secondly, Moreton and Spiller (1998) consider synergies between PCS to PCS as well as 
PCS to cellular synergies.50  Their results indicate that the winning bidder's and second to 
lowest bidder's local PCS license coverage has a positive and significant effect on the 
winning bid.  This result is consistent with the result of Ausubel et al (1997).  The effect 
of global synergies was moderate in their study. 
Cramton (1997) descriptively analyzes the first six spectrum auctions conducted 
by the FCC from July 1994 to May 1996.  He points out that one of the primary goals in 
the design of FCC spectrum auctions was efficiency51 and not revenue maximization.  
With this objective FCC adopted simultaneous, multiple round, open, ascending bid 
auctions.  Cramton (1997) discusses the pros and cons of the sequential and simultaneous 
auction formats.  He points out that one of the disadvantages of sequential auctions is that 
family income, the geographic area, and variables that capture economic activity in the area.  The number 
of subscribers reflects the demand.  The median family income for the residents in the area is included as a 
control for wealth. The economic activity is measured by including the percentage of population employed 
by financial, insurance and real estate sectors.          
50Authors point out that, some state level cellular telephone regulations makes PCS licenses more attractive 
to service providers.  These regulations affect the intensity of synergies that a bidder could derive.
51 Cramton points out that, high auction prices are consistent with efficiency i.e. high prices in these 
auctions are coming from firms that have higher values (due to synergies assuming that these firms can 
provide better services to the customers at lower prices). 
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bidders can not switch back and change their bids.  In the simultaneous format bidders 
can do such changes whenever they needed since these are open bid auctions. Bidders 
have been able to win their desired set of licenses and Cramton (1997), points out this is 
an efficient outcome achieved by the auction format adopted by the FCC.    
De Silva (2005) examines the impact of bidding behavior in spatially correlated 
projects auctioned off by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation with the emphasis 
in geographic synergies. His analysis is purely in the sequential framework. He finds 
aggressive bidding behavior and higher winning probability in spatially correlated 
projects. Neil Gandal (1997) examines the competition for licenses in Israeli Area Cable 
Television which were awarded in sequential auctions.  He finds aggressive bidding 
behavior overtime when the licenses are interdependent.  These findings are consistent 
with the existing literature relevant to synergies in auctions.        
5.3. Data
This study uses ODOT auction data from January 1997 to November 200352 to 
study differences in bidding behavior between sequential and simultaneous auctions in 
the presence of synergies. As mentioned earlier, ODOT auctions off 30-35 projects every 
month.  The total value of these projects is around forty three million dollars.   Before 
April 2002 the auctions were held in two sessions within a day of the month. At the end 
of each session, ODOT released information about the concluded auctions. After April 
2002 all projects were offered simultaneously in a single session. This study attempts to 
capture differences that can be attributed to the sequential nature of earlier auctions. 
The ODOT data were obtained from four reports, namely the project plan holder 
list, as read bid report, low bid report and award notices which are available on the 
52 There were no projects auctioned off in December 2003.
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ODOT web site. The project plan holder list includes names of the firms that have 
purchased project plans.  For every project the ODOT prepares a project plan that 
includes some of the design features of the project.  In order to submit bids at ODOT 
auctions firms have to go through a pre-qualification process53 set forth by ODOT and 
must purchase the project plan.  Bid information of every project is available through the 
as read bid report.  It contains all bids submitted by the firm together with their names.  
This is a vital piece of information for the firms to learn about their rivals in the bidding 
process.  Also the as read bid report contains the county where the project is located and 
the project description.  The project description gives information about the type of 
project i.e. asphalt paving, bridge work, traffic lighting etc.  The low bid report was used 
to obtain the project engineering cost estimate and the number of calendar days required 
to complete a given project.  The project engineering cost estimate is prepared by the 
ODOT engineer’s office; it contains a detailed estimate of different cost components. The 
low bid report includes only the total value of the project cost estimate.  This estimate 
was not revealed by the ODOT prior to bid letting until January 2000.  After January 
2000 ODOT started revealing the cost estimate prior to bid letting and this study consider 
that policy change in the analysis.  The name of the winning bidder and his location were 
recorded from the award notice report.  In addition, the project identification number, the 
month and the session of the project (relevant for auctions held in morning and afternoon 
sessions) were also recorded.  
53 In the pre-qualification process, the ODOT scrutinizes the financial statements, working capital available 
at the time of bidding and the firm history related to successful completion of projects.    
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The regression analysis uses data from January 1998 to November 2003.54  The 
auction statistics for the full sample as well as the sub-samples before and after the 
change in the auction format are given in Table 5.2.  The period before the change is 
from January 1998 to March 2002, which consists of 51 months of auction data.  The 
period after the change in the auction format is from April 2002 to November 2003, 
which consists of 20 months of auction data. The full sample consists of 2318 auctions, 
while the sub sample before has 1709 auctions, and the sample after has 609 auctions.  
The total number of bids in the full sample is 6261, and the sample before has 4476 bids 
while the sample after has 1785 bids.  In the analysis, the bids are normalized by the 
engineering cost estimate of the project and are called relative bids.  Mean relative bids 
for the full sample and sub samples are given in the Table 5.2.  Notice the slight decline 
in the mean relative bids in the period after the change in auction format compared to the 
period before.  The analysis in this study is focused on empirical testing of this 
difference.  The next section presents the empirical model and variables used in the 
analysis.                    
5.4. Empirical Analysis
The goal in the empirical analysis is to examine the impact of the change in the 
auction format on the seller’s revenue and the bidding behavior in the presence of 
potential synergies among projects.  The study identifies sequentially placed bids and 
simultaneously placed bids.  Then it identifies within a given month which projects have 
a potential for synergies that could lower their cost if won by a single bidder and 
54 This study uses the information from the year 1997 to create historical information and control for bidder 
and rival history in the analysis.  The definition and details about the construction of these variables are in 
the following sections.
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characterize them as high and low synergy projects. Then the empirical model and the 
variables are explained in detail.  
5.4.1. Bidder group classification
As in Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) and Rosenthal and Wang (1996), this study 
identifies global bidders. In this study, a global bidder is defined as a bidder who bids on 
two or more projects in a given month.55  Global bidders submitted bids before and after 
April 2002.  They are classified as follows:
1. Sequential Bids (submitted only before April 2002).
2. Simultaneous Bids (since April 2002).
5.4.1.1. Classification of Sequential Bidders
Single- Session and Two –Session Bidders
Due to the sequential nature of the ODOT auctions before April 2002, one must 
be careful identifying the sequentially placed bids.  Under this auction format, bidders 
can bid both in morning and afternoon sessions.  All global bidders who bid before April 
2002 grouped into two groups, Single-Session Bidders who bid only in morning or 
afternoon sessions and Two-Session Bidders who bid in both sessions.  
Two-Bid Group and Multiple-Bid Group
The Two-Session Bidders are used to identify those who place sequential bids. All 
Two-Session Bidders are separated into two groups: Sequential Two-Bid Group and 
Sequential Multiple-Bid Group.  The bidders in the first group have placed one bid in 
each session, sequentially to a total of two bids in a given month.  The bidders in the 
second group have placed multiple bids in one or both sessions. For those bidders some 
55 Any bidder who places one bid in a given month is not included in the analysis since the focus is on 
global bidders.  
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bids are simultaneously placed without any knowledge of the bidding outcome in other 
auctions held that day and some are placed sequentially and the bids in the afternoon 
session can be adjusted strategically based on the morning outcome.  The purpose of this 
distinction is to isolate purely sequential effect from mixed bidding effects.  
AM-Bidders and PM-Bidders
Single session bidders are grouped into two groups considering whether they 
place bids in the morning or afternoon session.  If bidders bid only in the morning session 
they are identified as AM-Bidders.  If the bids are placed only in the afternoon they are 
called PM-Bidders.
Bidders bidding for High Synergy and Low Synergy Projects
All bids submitted by multiple bidders within a month are grouped according to 
the intensity of synergies.  Partly for simplicity and partly because there is no continuous 
way to do the identification, two synergy levels are considered: High Synergy and Low 
Synergy.  A bidder bidding on two projects can benefit from high synergies if: 1) the bids 
submitted by a bidder in a given month are placed within the same field division56, and 2) 
those bids in the same field division (Figure 5.2 presents ODOT field divisions) are of the 
same project type57.  Therefore if multiple bids placed by a bidder are within the same 
field division and within the same project type, it is assumed those bidders can benefit 
from potentially higher level of synergies, relative to other bidders. If the bids on projects 
do not belong to the high synergy group, they are classified as Low Synergy bids.  With
56 There are eight field divisions in Oklahoma identified by the ODOT (Figure 2 represents ODOT field 
divisions).  A field division consists of several adjoining Oklahoma counties.  When bidders place several 
bids within the same field division, this study assumes bidders can realize synergies due to close location of 
these projects.     
57 Considering the project description (such as asphalt, bridgework, traffic lighting, grading and draining 
etc.) this study groups all the projects into seven main project types. These project types are explained in 
detail in the section describing the empirical model. 
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the classification of High and Low Synergy groups there are total of eight groups of 
multiple bids under the Sequential auction format (see Figure 5.1). 
All groups of bids can be summarized as follows.
Bids in two sessions (before the auction format change):  
AM-Bids High (low) synergy projects
PM-Bids High (low) synergy projects
Two-Bids in high (low) synergy projects 
Multiple-Bids in high (low) synergy projects 
Bids in a single session (after the auction format change): 
Am-Bids in high (low) synergy projects
PM-Bids in high (low) synergy projects 
5.4.1.2. Classification of Simultaneous Bidders 
A similar approach is taken as in the previous section to group simultaneous 
bidders and their bids.  All simultaneous bidders are divided into two groups as 
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group and Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group. Bidders in the Two-
Bid Group have submitted only two bids in a given month while the bidders in the 
multiple-bid group have submitted more than two bids.  The two-bid group is identified 
as the analogous group to Sequential Two-Bid group for comparison purposes.  
The bids submitted by those groups are further classified as bids that are in 
projects with the potential for High or Low synergies.  Thus there are four bid groups 
under the simultaneous auction format (See Figure 5.1).  
These groups can be summarized as follows.
Two-Bids in high (or low) synergy projects 
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Multiple-Bids in high (or low) synergy projects
There are twelve variables altogether that identify the groups as depicted in Figure 
5.1.  The number of bids and wins for each of these variables are given in Table 5.3.  
5.4.2. Empirical Model
The dependent variables in the regression analysis are relative bid and relative 
winning bid. Bids and winning bids are normalized by the engineering cost estimate of 
the project to obtain these dependent variables.  The explanatory variables identify the 
intensity of existing potential synergies.  Reduced form regression model that is 
considered as the base model in the analysis, takes the following form.      
ii ZXy εγβα +++=
      where,
),0(~ 2ii σε .
The first set of variables consists of eleven dummy variables58 represented by X,
and identifies bids based on whether there are synergies across different projects offered.   
The second set of variables consists of other qualitative and quantitative variables and is 
represented by Z in the model.  These variables can be broadly categorized into variables 
representing auction characteristics, bidder characteristics, rival characteristics, and the 
variables that control for time variant factors.  
Variables representing auction characteristics include project types, project size, 
the source of funding for the project, and the number of bidders in an auction.  As in De 
Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003) and De Silva (2005) all projects are 
grouped into seven broad project types based on the project descriptions given in the 
58 Of the twelve dummy variables that identify different bidder groups multiple-bid simultaneous bidders 
with lower synergies group is omitted in the regression.
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reports available on the ODOT web site.  These project types are asphalt paving projects, 
clearance and bank protection projects, bridge projects, grading and draining projects, 
concrete work, traffic signals and lighting projects, and miscellaneous projects.59
Miscellaneous projects were omitted in the regression so that there are six project type 
variables.60  These variables control for variation of bidding behavior across these project 
types.  
Large projects variable is used to identify project size (Large Projects--projects 
with engineering estimate over one million dollars).  The project engineering cost 
estimate is used to identify large and small projects.  In general, large projects are subject 
to different work requirements, such as Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Programs61
requirements.  This variable captures the variability between large and small projects.  
All projects costing over one million dollars are defined as large projects.  This includes 
the largest 24% of the projects in the sample.  
Also a variable is used to identify the funding source of projects that represents 
another auction characteristic.  ODOT projects are funded by the federal government and 
the state government.  Federally funded projects are subject to Federal guidelines.62 Such 
differences between federal and state projects can have an impact on the bidding 
behavior.  The next variable relates to the number of bids in an auction. It is actually the
log of the Number of Bids. In the auction literature, this variable has been used as a 
59 Miscellaneous projects are landscaping, waterline adjustments, intersection modification, parking etc.  
60 Recall that, these project type variables and the field division variable are used to identify bidders with 
high synergies.
61 A Disadvantage Business Enterprise is defined as an enterprise with more than 51% ownership by 
socially and economically disadvantaged groups as defined by the Small Business Administration 
regulations.  If the firm is a general contractor, the firm’s gross receipts averaged over a three years period 
cannot exceed $17.4 million.
62 For example the main contractor of a federally funded project must provide equal opportunity to 
disadvantaged business groups in the allocation of any sub-contracts.  Also, the main contractor must avoid 
any sort of discrimination among the sub-contractors.    
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control for the degree of competition in the auction.63   In this study the number of bids 
submitted by both global and local bidders is included. 
The next group of variables in Z represents bidder characteristics.  These variables 
include Firm’s Past Winning to Bid Ratio and the Capacity Utilization of a firm.  A given 
firms past number of wins divided by the past number of bids submitted is used as the 
measure of the firms past success rate (Winning to Bid Ratio). A higher Winning to Bid 
Ratio implies a higher success rate in the past.  This study considers only the last twelve 
months of bidding and winning statistics since a given bidder’s current success rate is 
mostly likely to be represented by his immediate past bidding and winning history. 64
Capacity utilization (Capacity Utilization) of a firm is the backlog of a firm divided by 
the maximum backlog65 of that firm during the sample period.  Similar capacity 
utilization measures have been used by Porter and Zona (1988) and Bajari and Ye (2002).  
The backlog of the firm is the dollar value of the unfinished work from previously won 
contracts.66  The capacity utilization of the firm reflects how much of the firm’s capacity 
is being utilized by already won contracts.  Firms with a larger capacity utilized would 
have a relatively lower capacity left for further projects.            
This study also employs a variable that captures toughness of rivals.  Any given 
bidder is faced with a set of rivals in every auction except those auctions that have only 
one bid.  If a given bidder is faced with a tougher set of rivals, then the bidder is expected 
63 See Gandal (1997), Hendricks, Pinske, and Porter (1999), De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 
2003), and De Silva (2005).
64 Winning to Bid Ratio and ARWP Ratio (describe in the following paragraph) have been used in De Silva, 
Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003) considering the bidding and winning statistics from the beginning 
of the sample (bid counts and win counts start from 1997).
65 The maximum backlog of a firm that has won contracts but never had a backlog (if the project was 
completed within the same month there will not be a backlog left for the next month) is the largest project 
the firm won.   Also firms that never won any contact will have zero capacity utilization since full capacity 
is available to use at the time of bidding.     
66 The backlog of a firm is computed as in De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopoulou (2002, 2003).
93
to bid more aggressively in that auction in order to win.67  This is not the case if the same 
bidder faces a relatively weaker set of rivals.  To construct this variable, rivals’ previous 
success in winning auctions is computed.  This is computed as the number of previous 
successes divided by the number of plans purchased for every bidder in an auction.  The 
history of the last twelve months is considered when counting the past number of 
successes and past number of plans held.  Then these ratios were averaged across the set 
of rivals for any given bidder to obtain the average rivals’ winning to plan holder ratio 
(ARWP Ratio).  A higher ARWP Ratio implies a tougher set of rivals.  
A variable is also included (After January 2000) that identifies the difference in 
the two time periods due to another policy change that occurred in January 2000.  Before 
January 2000 ODOT did not reveal the engineering cost estimate of the projects 
(prepared by the ODOT), before bidders submitted bids.  ODOT changed this policy so 
that it now reveals its estimate to the bidders pre-bid letting.  This policy change was 
investigated in chapter 3 and observed aggressive bidding behavior after the policy 
change.  Therefore this variable is included to identify this change in the time period.  
The next set of variables in Z controls for aggregate measures such as business 
activity that varies with time.  These are four monthly variables.  The first variable 
controls for the volume of projects auctioned off in a month measured in terms of dollars.  
A higher dollar value reflects a higher volume of projects.  Bidding behavior could be 
affected by the volume of projects in a month.  The sum of the engineering cost estimate 
total of a month for all the projects is used as the project volume measure.  Then that 
dollar value is converted to a real value using 1997 as the base year (Real Value of 
67 From the plan holder list available to the bidders from ODOT (before bid letting) bidders have the 
knowledge of potential bidders in advance.
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Monthly Engineering Estimate Total).  In the regression, the log of the real value is 
included.  The monthly total value of the estimates could vary depending on the 
budgetary conditions in the state of Oklahoma.  
The second monthly variable in the Z matrix is the Number of Projects per Firm
in a given month. This variable captures two factors that change every month: the number 
of projects auctioned off and the number of firms that bid in a month.68  The bidding 
behavior could be affected by the availability of projects per firm in a given month.  The 
third monthly variable is the Concentration Ratio.  This is constructed similarly to the 
Herfindhal Index.  First, the share of every project is computed.  That is, the engineering 
cost estimate of a project is divided by the sum of the engineering cost estimate of the 
month.  This value is then squared and summed across all the projects in a month to 
obtain the concentration ratio.  A higher concentration ratio implies a concentrated 
market.  Bidding behavior could be affected by the monthly value of this ratio.   The 
fourth monthly variable is a measure of business activity in Oklahoma, the Oklahoma 
General Business Index69 (OKGBI). This variable would be an indicator of the 
performance of the construction industry in a month.  Means of all variables in the 
empirical model are presented in Table 5.4.
The model is estimated using OLS method followed by post estimation 
coefficient tests to test the differences across the bidder groups.  Further, several 
robustness checks are carried out on the results of the base model.  The next section 
68 Note that a given firm can purchase several plans for different projects.  The number of firms therefore is 
different from the number plan holders in a given month.  The number of firms in a month is counted in 
this case.
69 The index provides a relative measure for judging the level of economy today based on the benchmark 
year 1987.  Further details about this index can be obtained from www.origins.ou.edu/databases/.  
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presents main results and comparisons among different bid groups when bidders are 
faced with different synergy levels.       
5.5. Results and Discussion
As a first step in the estimation process, and before making the distinction 
between projects with high or low potential for synergies, overall differences in the 
bidding behavior between the two time periods is examined (due to the change in the 
auction format).  The initial model identifies the time period before and after the change 
in the auction format through a variable called Simultaneous. That variable takes the 
value of 1 in the period after March 2002.  The results from the initial model indicate a 
0.03 significant decline in the overall bidding level and a 0.03 significant decline in the 
winning bid level after the change in the auction format.  The results of the initial model 
are given in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.5.  This raises the question, is this decline in 
the bid level caused by the change in the auction format? If the answer is yes, what 
causes this change? Is it the potential for synergies or other factors? In order to answer 
these questions, the differences in bidding behavior between the bidder groups in the two 
formats of auctions are tested.  
First the base model and the winning bid model are estimated. Different bidder 
groups in these models are distinguished depending on the level of synergy. These results 
are given in the Table 5.6, columns (1) and in (2) respectively. The omitted group is the 
Sequential Multiple-Bid Low Synergy group. Considering the behavior across auction 
formats, this study finds more aggressive bidding behavior in the simultaneous auctions 
than the sequential.  The results of the comparisons between bidder groups for the base 
model and winning bid model are summarized in the following table. 
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Table 5.1:  Comparisons for Base Model and Winning Bids Model
COMPARISON BETWEEN 
SEQUENTIAL AND SIMULTANEOUS 
AUCTION FORMATS BASE MODEL WINNING BIDS
TWO-BID GROUPS
(1) HIGH SYNERGY No difference No difference
(2) LOW SYNERGY No difference No difference
MULTIPLE BID GROUPS




(4) LOW SYNERGY Aggressive bidding in 
the simultaneous 
auction format
Aggressive bidding in 
the simultaneous 
auction format
In the Table 5.1 above, in the first two comparisons Sequential Two-Bid Groups
are compared to the  Simultaneous Two-Bid Groups both with high and low potential for 
synergies. These groups allow isolation of purely simultaneous and purely sequential 
effects. The results indicate that there is no significant difference in the bidding behavior 
across the auction formats in the overall bids and in the winning bids.  The third and 
fourth comparisons in both models indicate aggressive bidding behavior by simultaneous 
Multiple-Bid groups.  Notice that the third comparison in the base model is consistent 
with Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) theory while the fourth comparison is not, in both 
models.  Thus, this study does not find consistent evidence to support Krishna and 
Rosenthal (1996) theory that predicts higher revenue in simultaneous auctions when 
bidders have higher level of synergy. 
Of course, there are differences between the empirical work and the theory 
developed by Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) that may be responsible for the difference in 
the outcome. For example, the model by Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) examines private 
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values while the construction contracts considered in this study have both private and 
common value components.  This can make a difference in the ranking of auctions as 
Hausch (1986) suggested. Also as Feng and Chatterjee (2003) suggest that the intensity 
of competition can have an effect on the outcome. ODOT auctions off its contracts to a 
relatively small number of competing bidders that could face the potential for synergies. 
Several other specifications are considered to allow further comparisons between 
the groups of bidders identified in the analysis.  First, firm fixed effects are incorporated 
to the base model and to the winning bids model.  Fixed effects results are presented in 
Table 5.7, columns (1) and (2) for the overall bid level and the winning bid level.  The 
results do not indicate any significant difference across the four comparisons either at the 
overall bid level or at the winning bid level. 
Since the dependent variable relative bid is the bid normalized by the estimate, it 
does not reflect the project size differences.  In an attempt to take that into account, the 
relative bid regression model is weighted by the project engineering cost estimates so that 
relative bids of larger projects would have larger weight than relative bids of smaller 
projects.  Three models are re-estimated with the weights: the base model, fixed effects 
model and the winning bids model with fixed effects.  Results for the weighted models 
are presented in Table 5.8 columns (1), (2) and (3).  
The results of the overall bid regression with weights are presented in Table 5.8 
column (1).  The results indicate when competing for high synergy projects the 
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid group bid more aggressively than the Sequential Multiple-Bid 
group which is consistent with the base model result. Also in the low synergy projects, 
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid group bid aggressively relative to Sequential Multiple-Bid 
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group.  This is again consistent with the base model result.  The other comparisons 
between sequential and simultaneous Two-Bid groups; both high and low synergy are not 
significant.
 The weighted relative bid regression with fixed effects and the weighted relative 
winning bid regression with fixed effects are presented in Table 5.8 columns (2) and (3) 
respectively.  The results indicate that there is no significant difference in the four 
comparison groups (as in the Table 5.1) at the overall bids and the winning bids levels.
   Among the variables in the Z matrix the variable identifying Large Projects was 
significant in all the models except in the winning bid regression (Table 5.6 column (2)).  
Bidders show aggressive bidding in larger projects relative to the smaller projects 
indicating more competition for larger projects.  The log number of bidders was 
significant in all models indicating aggressive bidding behavior as the number of bidders 
increase in the auctions.  The Winning to Bid Ratio that measures the bidders’ previous 
success rate, was significant at the overall bid level and had the expected effect.  A higher 
Winning to Bid Ratio leads to more aggressive bidding.  The ARWP Ratio variable that 
measures toughness of the rivals was negative and significant in all winning bid 
regression models except for the weighted winning bid regression indicating that a 
tougher set of rivals would lead to more aggressive bidding behavior.            
A variable is used to represent the difference in the bidding behavior due to 
revelation of the engineering cost estimate since January 2000.  The coefficient of this 
variable is negative and significant in all the models.  It indicates on average the Relative 
Bids have declined by about 0.05 after ODOT started revealing the engineering cost 
estimate prior to bid letting.  Among the other time variant variables the Real Value of 
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Monthly Estimate Total was significant only in the winning bid regressions and in 
weighted models but does not show a systematic sign for the coefficient.  The number of 
projects per firm in a month was significant in the two initial models, base model, 
winning bid model and in the fixed effects models.  The results indicate more aggressive 
bidding behavior with a higher number of projects per firm. 
The Concentration Ratio was significant in two of the weighted regression 
models (base model and fixed effects models with weights).  The coefficient on the 
Concentration Ratio indicates more competition when the projects are concentrated.  A 
higher Concentration Ratio indicates that funds are allocated to a relatively smaller 
number of projects. The aggressive bidding observe with the concentration ratio could be 
due to the competition among large firms.
 The variable that measure the overall economic activity, OKGBI had a positive 
and significant effect at the overall bid regression indicating relatively lesser competition 
for road construction projects when there is a lot of other economic activity in the state.  
The variables describing Capacity Utilization and Federal Projects did not show a 
systematic significance in the analysis.
This study also tested whether more aggressive bidding behavior in high synergy 
bidder groups can be observed than low synergy bidder groups (within the same auction 
format). These tests present an opportunity to compare the results with other evidence in 
the literature. In particular, after estimating all models, comparisons are made between: 
AM high and low synergy groups, PM high and low synergy groups, Sequential Two-Bid
high and low synergy bidder groups, Sequential Multiple-Bid high and low synergy 
bidder groups, Simultaneous Two-Bid high and low synergy bidder groups and 
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Simultaneous Multiple-Bid high and low synergy bidder groups.  The F-test statistics for 
these tests are presented in Table 5.9.  The study finds some weak evidence of aggressive 
bidding by the Multiple-Bid group with high synergy (relative to the corresponding low 
synergy group).  The remaining comparisons between high and low synergy groups at the 
winning bid level did not show a significant difference. 
In addition to the above analysis, this study considers the effect of the format of 
auction and the competition on different types of projects. This study introduces the 
dummy variable Simultaneous Auction Format to capture the period after March 2002. 
Within each project type, this variable identifies differences in bidding due to the auction 
format. Also this study included a variable capturing the intensity of competition and its 
interaction with the auction format and a synergy variable that identifies same division 
bids for a given firm.  It is examined whether there is evidence that ODOT benefits with 
the simultaneous auction format when auctioning off more uncertain projects (projects 
with common value elements and potentially higher winner’s curse) such as bridgework 
relative to more certain projects (less uncertainty) such as traffic signals. Project wise 
regression results are presented in Table 5.10 and 5.11. The results are not conclusive for 
every project type. It seems that the simultaneous auction format performs better in 
auctions of bridge projects (common value) and worse in auctions of asphalt related 
projects (private value). The results for the rest of the project types are insignificant. This 
study also examines the relative performance of the two formats of auctions in light of 
Hausch’s (1986) predictions.  He predicts that in the presence of winner’s curse the 
simultaneous auction format generates higher revenues (when bidders signal their true 
values).  When bidders try to mimic each other, there is less overall winner’s curse and 
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the sequential format generates higher revenue. Among different project types, 
bridgework has in general higher cost uncertainty and fits better the framework of 
common value auctions. Results indicate that in this framework the simultaneous auction 
format performs better (evident by the negative coefficient in project type 3 presented in 
Table 5.10). Despite the fact that there is some variation in the bids, suggestive of the fact 
that the bidders probably don't mimic each other, there is no hard evidence to conclude 
that they indeed signal their true values. In that sense, this is not a direct test of Hausch's 
results.  Hausch just provides a possible explanation for the observed outcome. 
This study also attempts to find supportive evidence for Feng and Chatterjee 
(2003) who predicts that, in private value auctions, under intense competition the 
simultaneous format performs better in terms of revenue. The intensity of competition is 
identified by the number of projects per firm. This variable is interacted with the 
Simultaneous variable to distinguish between different effects of competition in the two 
auction formats (Projects per Firm under the Simultaneous Auction Format). The 
interaction effect should be positive and significant in simultaneous auctions at least for 
auctions of asphalt and signal type projects. The results do not show a significant pattern. 
5.6. Conclusion
Overall, this study finds some evidence of aggressive bidding behavior in the 
simultaneous auction format. There is a 3% decrease overall in the level of bids as well as 
winning bids after the state adopted the simultaneous auction format.  The decrease in the 
bid level implies a benefit to ODOT. The results provide some evidence of aggressive 
bidding by Multiple-Bid groups facing potentially high synergies in the simultaneous 
auction format, in the overall bid regression but not in the winning bid regressions. 
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However the results do not provide consistent support to the theory by Krishna and 
Rosenthal (1996).    
Comparisons between high and low synergy bidder groups within the same 
auction format indicate some weak evidence of more aggressive bidding behavior among 
the multiple bidders with higher level of synergy in the overall bid regression.  
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Figure 5.2: ODOT Field Divisions (Source: Oklahoma Department of
Transportation web site). 
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for the Regression Sample
Full Sample Before the change 
in the Auction 
Format
After the change in 
the Auction Format.
Number of Auctions 2318 1709 609
Number of Plan Holders 8852 6238 2614








Number of Firms 156 139 98
Number of Bids 6261 4476 1785






















Standard deviations are in the parenthesis 
106
Table 5.3: Bid Counts and Win Counts for Different Synergy Levels 






Before the Change in the Auction Format 
Number of Bidders bid only in morning 552 156 28.3%
Number of bidders bid only in afternoon 337 92 27.3%
Sequential Two-Bids with High Synergy 130 37 28.5%
Sequential Two-Bids with Low Synergy 441 136 30.8%
Sequential Multiple-Bids with High Synergy 1077 309 28.7%
Sequential Multiple-Bids with Low Synergy 1964 509 25.9%
After the Change in the Auction Format
Simultaneous-Two Bids with High Synergy 64 19 29.7%
Simultaneous-Two Bids with Low Synergy 311 78 25.1%
Simultaneous-Multiple Bids with High Synergy 667 156 23.4%
Simultaneous-Multiple Bids with Low Synergy 748 196 26.2%
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Table 5.4: Means of the Regression Variables
Variable Mean
Relative Bid 1.056 (0.278)
Relative Winning Bid 0.934 (0.204)
Simultaneous Auction Format 0.297 (0.457)
AM-Bidders-High Synergy 0.023 (0.150)
AM-Bidders-Low Synergy 0.063 (0.243)
PM-Bidders-High Synergy 0.016 (0.124)
PM-Bidders-Low Synergy 0.037 (0.189)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-High Synergy 0.020 (0.142)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-Low Synergy 0.069 (0.253)
Sequential Multiple Bid Group-High Synergy 0.169 (0.374)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-High Synergy 0.012 (0.107)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-Low Synergy 0.051 (0.219)
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group-High 
Synergy
0.114 (0.318)









Large  Projects 0.247 (0.431)
Federal Projects 0.630 (0.483)
Log of Number of Bids 1.571 (0.362)
ARWP  Ratio 0.131 (0.072)
Winning to Bid Ratio 0.236 (0.168)
Capacity Utilization 0.278 (0.387)
After January 2000 0.666 (0.472)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of 
Engineering Estimate
17.495 (0.619)
Monthly Number of Projects per Firm 0.568 (0.142)
Concentration Ratio 0.128 (0.070)
OKGBI 128.886 (1.951)
Note:  Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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Relative Winning Bid 
Constant    0.034 (0.237)       0.229 (0.328)
Simultaneous Auction Format -0.033* (0.008) -0.026* (0.012)
Project-1 -0.034 (0.031) 0.113* (0.038)
Project-2 0.158* (0.059)       0.180 (0.112)
Project-3    0.038 (0.031) 0.076* (0.038)
Project-4 -0.061* (0.030) 0.087* (0.038)
Project-5 -0.019 (0.037) 0.099* (0.047)
Project-6 -0.072* (0.032) 0.084* (0.041)
Large  Projects -0.066* (0.009) -0.022 (0.012)
Federal Projects -0.010 (0.010)       0.004 (0.014)
Log of Number of Bids -0.075* (0.010) -0.116* (0.013)
ARWP  Ratio -0.070 (0.052) -0.144* (0.065)
Winning to Bid Ratio -0.146* (0.023) -0.047 (0.032)
Capacity Utilization    0.018 (0.010)       0.015 (0.016)
After January 2000 -0.054* (0.009) -0.039* (0.012)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of Engineering 
Estimates
   0.001 (0.007) 0.024* (0.010)
Monthly Number of Projects per Firm -0.083* (0.032) -0.135* (0.041)
Concentration Ratio -0.086 (0.069) -0.130 (0.088)
OKGBI 0.010* (0.002)       0.004 (0.003)
Number of Observations 6261 1685
R-Squared 0.065 0.100
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Relative Winning Bid 
Constant     0.011 (0.241)          0.256 (0.326)
AM-Bidders-High Synergy -0.027 (0.023) -0.003 (0.038)
AM-Bidders-Low Synergy -0.026 (0.015)          0.021 (0.022)
PM-Bidders-High Synergy -0.033 (0.024) -0.020   (0.022)
PM-Bidders-Low Synergy -0.024 (0.019)          0.038 (0.032)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-High Synergy -0.056* (0.021) -0.022 (0.034)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-Low Synergy -0.034* (0.015) -0.012 (0.018)
Sequential Multiple Bid Group-High Synergy -0.043* (0.010) -0.007 (0.015)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-High Synergy -0.052 (0.037) -0.025 (0.044)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-Low Synergy -0.032 (0.020) -0.042 (0.028)
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group-High Synergy -0.082* (0.011)          0.001 (0.017)
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group-Low Synergy -0.035* (0.013) -0.042* (0.019)
Project-1 -0.020 (0.031)          0.113 (0.039)
Project-2 0.160* (0.059)          0.179 (0.112)
Project-3 -0.029 (0.031)          0.074 (0.039)
Project-4 -0.055 (0.030)          0.087* (0.038)
Project-5 -0.012 (0.037)          0.102* (0.047)
Project-6 -0.066* (0.032)          0.082* (0.041)
Large  Projects -0.066* (0.009) -0.021 (0.012)
Federal Projects -0.010 (0.010)          0.004 (0.014)
Log of Number of Bids -0.075* (0.010) -0.116* (0.013)
ARWP  Ratio -0.060 (0.052) -0.152* (0.065)
Winning to Bid Ratio -0.143* (0.023) -0.048 (0.032)
Capacity Utilization     0.016 (0.010)          0.014 (0.016)
After January 2000 -0.055* (0.009) -0.039* (0.012)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of Engineering 
Estimates
      0.001 (0.007)          0.023* (0.010)
Monthly Number of Projects per Firm -0.079* (0.033) -0.135* (0.043)
Concentration Ratio -0.086 (0.069) -0.127 (0.088)
OKGBI 0.011* (0.002)          0.004 (0.003)
Number of Observations 6261 1685
R-Squared 0.070 0.100
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Relative Winning Bid 
Constant      1.361 (0.238)      0.142 (0.331)
AM-Bidders-High Synergy -0.016 (0.027) -0.021 (0.043)
AM-Bidders-Low Synergy -0.029* (0.014) -0.001 (0.022)
PM-Bidders-High Synergy -0.007 (0.025) -0.031 (0.024)
PM-Bidders-Low Synergy -0.029 (0.019)      0.019 (0.033)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-High Synergy -0.055* (0.020) -0.041 (0.037)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-Low Synergy -0.033* (0.015) -0.021 (0.018)
Sequential Multiple Bid Group-High Synergy -0.040* (0.010) -0.034* (0.015)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-High Synergy -0.029 (0.040) -0.026 (0.049)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-Low Synergy -0.025 (0.020) -0.066* (0.028)
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group-High Synergy -0.055* (0.011) -0.017 (0.018)
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group-Low Synergy -0.016 (0.014) -0.038* (0.019)
Project-1 -0.030 (0.030)      0.052 (0.040)
Project-2      0.140* (0.059)      0.063 (0.108)
Project-3 -0.022 (0.031)      0.012 (0.044)
Project-4 -0.037 (0.028)      0.041 (0.040)
Project-5 -0.018 (0.034)      0.046 (0.045)
Project-6      0.009 (0.033)      0.096* (0.044)
Large  Projects -0.087* (0.009) -0.042* (0.013)
Federal Projects -0.001 (0.010)      0.002 (0.014)
Log of Number of Bids -0.069* (0.011) -0.109* (0.014)
ARWP  Ratio -0.009 (0.055) -0.160* (0.071)
Winning to Bid Ratio      0.044 (0.033)      0.085 (0.048)
Capacity Utilization      0.005 (0.013) -0.028 (0.022)
After January 2000 -0.063* (0.009) -0.032* (0.013)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of Engineering 
Estimates
-0.003 (0.007)      0.016 (0.010)
Monthly Number of Projects per Firm -0.067* (0.033) -0.091* (0.044)
Concentration Ratio -0.063 (0.065) -0.082 (0.090)
OKGBI      0.011* (0.002)      0.005 (0.003)
Number of Observations 6261 1685
R-Squared 0.167 0.254
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Bids with Fixed 
Effects 
Constant  0.405 (0.247)  0.372 (0.248)  0.446 (0.349)
AM-Bidders-High Synergy  0.021 (0.019)  0.031 (0.022)  0.026 (0.034)
AM-Bidders-Low Synergy  0.007 (0.015)  0.006 (0.015)  0.014 (0.030)
PM-Bidders-High Synergy -0.031 (0.024) -0.032 (0.023) -0.004 (0.033)
PM-Bidders-Low Synergy -0.001 (0.020)  0.000 (0.021) -0.041 (0.023)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-High 
Synergy 
-0.046* (0.023) -0.020* (0.024) -0.015 (0.032)
Sequential Two-Bid Group-Low Synergy -0.030* (0.014) -0.037 (0.014) -0.046* (0.018)
Sequential Multiple Bid Group-High 
Synergy
-0.009 (0.014) -0.012 (0.014) -0.045* (0.020)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-High 
Synergy
-0.053* (0.023) -0.048 (0.025) -0.045 (0.029)
Simultaneous Two-Bid Group-Low 
Synergy
-0.051* (0.015) -0.039* (0.016) -0.063* (0.022)
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group-High 
Synergy
-0.042* (0.012) -0.028* (0.012) -0.010 (0.025)
Simultaneous Multiple-Bid Group-Low 
Synergy
-0.029* (0.011) -0.025* (0.012) -0.034 (0.020)
Project-1  0.024 (0.023)  0.019 (0.024) -0.013 (0.032)
Project-2  0.087 (0.048)  0.061 (0.045) -0.032 (0.064)
Project-3  0.009 (0.021)  0.013 (0.023) -0.037 (0.031)
Project-4 -0.008 (0.021) -0.004 (0.021) -0.031 (0.026)
Project-5  0.019 (0.032)  0.003 (0.034) -0.027 (0.040)
Project-6 -0.013 (0.026)  0.042 (0.031)  0.019 (0.039)
Large  Projects -0.065* (0.009) -0.067* (0.009) -0.035* (0.014)
Federal Projects  0.030* (0.009)  0.031* (0.010)  0.012 (0.013)
Log of Number of Bids -0.064* (0.011) -0.062* (0.011) -0.087* (0.016)
ARWP  Ratio -0.077 (0.067) -0.074 (0.069) -0.059 (0.092)
Winning to Bid Ratio -0.095* (0.024)  0.000 (0.034)  0.070 (0.059)
Capacity Utilization  0.027* (0.010)  0.035* (0.012) -0.001 (0.017)
After January 2000 -0.059* (0.009) -0.066* (0.010) -0.045* (0.013)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of 
Engineering Estimate
-0.014 (0.008) -0.018* (0.008) -0.003 (0.011)
Monthly Number of  Projects per Firm -0.044 (0.032) -0.024 (0.032) -0.057 (0.045)
Concentration Ratio -0.240* (0.062) -0.231* (0.068) -0.127 (0.100)
OKGBI  0.009* (0.002)  0.007* (0.002)  0.005 (0.003)
Number of Observations 6261 6261 1685
R-Squared 0.138 0.214 0.370
Note:  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Table 5.9: F Statistics for the Coefficient Tests between High and Low Synergy Groups
The Null Hypothesis 
for the Coefficient 
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P-values are in the parenthesis.  * Denotes 5% significance.
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Constant   0.322 (0.425) 17.818* (5.921) -0.355 (0.387)
Simultaneous Auction Format 0.122* (0.058) 1.938 (0.989) -0.220* (0.053)
Bids in the Same Division -0.005 (0.012) -0.119 (0.113) -0.040* (0.011)
Large  Projects -0.059* (0.016) -0.332 (0.292) -0.041* (0.020)
Federal Projects -0.052* (0.015) -0.049 (0.218) -0.022 (0.014)
Log of Number of Bids -0.031 (0.017) -0.342 (0.228) -0.092* (0.017)
ARWP  Ratio -0.090 (0.063) -2.848 (1.856) 0.033 (0.102)
Winning to Bid Ratio -0.168* (0.029) -0.531 (0.381) -0.136* (0.039)
Capacity Utilization 0.048* (0.014) -0.057 (0.252) -0.012 (0.017)
After January 2000 -0.057* (0.014) -0.297 (0.176) -0.071* (0.014)
Log Real Value of Monthly Total of 
Engineering Estimates
-0.018 (0.010)  0.321* (0.123) 0.011 (0.010)
Monthly Number of Projects per 
Firm
0.083 (0.059) -1.700 (1.058) -0.202* (0.059)
Projects per Firm under the 
Simultaneous Auction Format
-0.138 (0.093) -2.351 (1.550)  0.292* (0.093)
Concentration Ratio -0.013 (0.134) -1.907 (2.913) -0.209* (0.092)
OKGBI 0.009* (0.003) -0.153* (0.051) 0.013* (0.003)
Number of Observations 1322 79 2941
R-Squared 0.084 0.432 0.068
Note:  Project 1: asphalt; project 2: bank protection, shoulder work; Project 3:  bridge work   
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
Denotes 5% significance
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Constant 0.162 (0.368) 4.353 (2.215) 0.038 (0.810) -0.870 (2.898)
Simultaneous 
Auction Format
0.017 (0.043) 0.065 (0.216) -0.201 (0.133) 0.173 (0.278)
Bids in the Same 
Division
-0.010 (0.010) -0.011 (0.047) 0.016 (0.023) -0.049 (0.070)
Large  Projects -0.085* (0.017) -0.034 (0.052) -0.111* (0.037) -0.177 (0.096)
Federal Projects 0.049* (0.011) -0.024 (0.048) 0.045 (0.038) 0.099 (0.092)
Log of Number of 
Bids
-0.072* (0.014) -0.062 (0.067) -0.126* (0.048) -0.063 (0.122)
ARWP  Ratio 0.010 (0.116) -0.321 (0.392) -0.238 (0.126) 0.204 (0.457)
Winning to Bid 
Ratio
-0.061 (0.036) 0.015 (0.129) -0.152* (0.065) -0.196 (0.152)
Capacity 
Utilization 
0.018 (0.013) 0.035 (0.093) 0.073* (0.030) 0.011 (0.063)
After January 2000 -0.058* (0.013) -0.222* (0.061)  0.052 (0.029) 0.010 (0.110)
Log Real Value of 
Monthly Total of 
Engineering 
Estimates
-0.019 (0.011) -0.026 (0.062)  0.014 (0.018) 0.097 (0.073)
Monthly Number of 
Projects per Firm
-0.015 (0.049) -0.111 (0.240) 0.028 (0.093) -0.531 (0.438)




-0.089 (0.076) -0.100 (0.374) 0.205 (0.233) -0.574 (0.530)
Concentration 
Ratio
-0.207* (0.099) 0.202 (0.347) -0.287 (0.192) 0.332 (0.450)
OKGBI 0.011* (0.003) -0.020 (0.016) 0.008 (0.006) 0.005 (0.022)
Number of 
Observations
992 149 546 211
R-Squared 0.124 0.221 0.077 0.120
Note:  Project 4: Grading and drainage projects; Project 5: concrete and pavement projects; Project 6: 
Signals; Project 7: Miscellaneous work   
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
* Denotes 5% significance
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Chapter 6
Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
6.1. Conclusions
This study investigates the impact of two key policy changes that were 
implemented by ODOT with respect to the procurement auctions in road construction 
contracts.  The first policy change that occurred in January 2000 dealt with the release of 
the engineering cost estimate and is examined in chapter 3.  The results of this study 
indicate a strong effect due to this policy change with a 0.066 decline in the overall 
relative bids and a 0.063 decline in the winning relative bid level.  The decline in the 
overall bids implies an increase of competition among bidders, and the decline in the 
winning bid level implies a decrease in the procurement costs after the policy change.  
These results are further confirmed by the analysis conducted pooling Oklahoma and 
Texas samples.  The results indicate that the decrease in bids in Oklahoma is significantly 
larger than the decrease in bids in Texas.  These findings are consistent with the theories 
proposed by Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Goeree and Offerman (1999, 2003) and the 
existing experimental work by Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987), Goeree and Offerman 
(2002) and Kagel and Levin (1986).  
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of additional information revealed by ODOT 
from the auctions for projects that were not awarded in the first round.  The impact of this 
information on bidding behavior in repeating auctions is examined.  The results indicate 
that the information revealed after the first round has led to only a moderate decline in the 
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overall bid level in the subsequent auctions.  The effect of the information that was 
released on the variance of the bids is also weak.  
Chapter 5 investigates the second policy change implemented by ODOT, namely, 
the change from the two-session auction format (sequential format) to the one-session 
auction format (simultaneous format).  The results indicate a 3% decrease in the overall 
bids and in the winning bid level due to this change.  Comparisons between bidder groups 
in the two auction formats find evidence of aggressive bidding among the bidders who 
bid on multiple projects with potentially high synergies after the policy change.  
Comparisons between high and low synergy groups within the same auction format 
provide some weak evidence of more aggressive bidding among the multiple bidders with 
high synergy.  
6.2. Limitations of the Study
There are number of limitations contained in this dissertation.  First, throughout 
this study, the firm capacity was approximated by the maximum backlog of a firm.  This 
measure is not ideal because it does not control for firm growth in capacity or capture 
economic activity of the firm outside of road procurement. A more appropriate measure 
would be the firms’ annual total revenue that includes activities outside of the road 
procurement.  Unfortunately, such a measure is unavailable in the state procurement data.
In chapter 5, the comparison of the two auction formats has several limitations.  
First, the ODOT auctions are not conducted in a sequential auction format (before the 
change in auction format) as specified in the theoretical literature (one object after the 
other within a sufficiently short interval).  Therefore, comparing sequential and 
simultaneous effects was limited to specific bidder groups.  Second, in the case of 
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multiple bids, both sequentially placed bids and simultaneously placed bids exist as 
mentioned earlier.  As a result, it is not possible to isolate one or the other effect in 
multiple bid groups.  In addition, the model in Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) uses a 
second-price sealed-bid mechanism while ODOT auctions use a first-price sealed-bid 
mechanism.  Also Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) consider a private value model while the 
construction contracts are more appropriately classified under the affiliated value 
framework.  This makes the link between the theory and the empirical test weaker.
6.3. Implications for Future Research
In the three essays of this study, the effect of the policy changes on bidders’ 
participation decisions in auctions was not examined.  This is important since it affects 
the number of bidders that participate in auctions and, thereby, the degree of competition 
in the auction.  Investigating which policies favor more bidder participation would be 
useful in formulating future policies related to procurement auctions.
In order to consider high synergy in chapter 5, this study considered bids placed 
within the same ODOT field division by a given bidder.  This could be further narrowed 
down to the county level in order to identify bids placed within the same county.  It will 
eliminate the projects that are not within the same county from the high synergy group 
leading to a closer set of projects (relative to the projects within the same field division).  
This will refine the high synergy definition that might affect the results of this chapter.   
   The paper by Benoit and Krishna (2001) predicts that optimal sequential auction 
format generates higher seller revenue than the simultaneous auction format.  Under the 
optimal sequential auction format they consider selling the more valuable object first.  
The order of sale could be investigated in ODOT auctions before April 2002.  It would be 
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interesting to investigate the patterns in order of sales in ODOT auctions and its effect on 
the procurement costs (seller’s revenue).  Future procurement policies can be tailored 
based on the understanding of these issues.
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